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HOUSING LAW-United States v. Columbus Country Club: How 
"RELIGIOUS" DOES AN ORGANIZATION HAVE TO BE TO QUALIFY 
FOR THE FAIR HOUSING ACT'S RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION 
EXEMPTION? 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1968, Congress passed the Fair Housing Act (the "Act") as 
part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 1 The Act's purpose was to "as­
sure every American a full opportunity to obtain housing for himself 
and his family free from any discrimination on account of race, color, 
religion, or national origin."2 The Act prohibits discrimination by 
owners of rental housing, lenders, real estate brokers, and others en­
gaged in the sale of housing. 3 However, section 3607 of the Act4 pro­
vides a limited exemption from these prohibitions to a "religious 
organization, association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or 
organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction 
with a religious organization, association, or society."s An entity con­
forming to the above description may limit "the sale, rental or occu­
pancy of dwellings which it owns or operates for other than a 
commercial purpose to persons of the same religion."6 The exemp­
tion's purpose is not explicitly stated in its language or legislative his­
1. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codi­
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1988». 
2. H.R. Res. 16340, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CoNG. REc. 8,407 (1968). For an in­
depth discussion of the problems created by housing discrimination, see Elliot M. 
Mincberg, Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 128, 129-33 (1976) (discussing problems resulting from racial 
segregation caused by housing discrimination) and Richard H. Sander, Comment, Individ­
ual Rights and Demographic Realities: The Problem 0/Fair Housing, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 
874 (1988) (discussing the reasons that fair housing laws have largely failed to improve 
racial segregation and suggesting alternative strategies). 
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-06 (1988). 
4. Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 807, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1988». 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1988). 
6. [d. 
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tory. However, Congress undoubtedly wished to protect religious 
organizations from governmental interference with their decisions re­
garding allocation of housing to members of their own religion, in ac­
cordance with the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the 
First Amendment.1 
While the exemption's application to religious organizations 
themselves is fairly straightforward, its interpretation in cases involv­
ing organizations that are operated, supervised or controlled by or in 
conjunction with religious organizations, associations or societies is 
more difficult. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently 
decided United States v. Columbus Country Club,S the first case to ex­
plicitly confront the exemption. This case presents the issue of how 
the exemption should be interpreted in clear terms.9 In Columbus 
Country Club, a private, nonprofit country club clearly discriminated 
in housing based on religion. It leased summer bungalow lots only to 
"annual members," and restricted "annual membership" to Catho­
7. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof." U.S. CoNST. amend. I. 
The Fair Housing Act itself explicitly recognizes constitutional limitations upon its 
provisions. Section 801 of the Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3601) provides that "[i]t is the 
policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing 
throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988) (original version at Pub. L. No. 
90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968» (emphasis added). 
A similar religious organization exemption is contained in the federal statute that pro­
hibits discrimination in employment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988) (original version at Title 
VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 702, Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat. 255). The purpose ofthe 
Title VII religious organization exemption was to protect those organizations' free exercise 
rights by preventing undue governmental interference in their employment decisions. See 
Duane E. Okamoto, Note, Religious Discrimination and the Title VII Exemption for Reli­
gious Organizations: A Basic Values Analysis/or the Proper Allocation o/Conflicting Rights, 
60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1375, 1417 (1987). 
8. 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2797 (1991). 
9. Id. The Columbus Country Club majority contended that the exemption was pre­
viously interpreted in United States v. Hughes Memorial Home, 396 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. 
Va. 1975). Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 883. The Columbus Country Club dissent 
disagreed, and stated that the Hughes court did not really interpret the exemption. Id. at 
886 n.l (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
Hughes involved a suit against a home for needy children by the Attorney General. 
The complaint alleged that the home discriminated against black children in violation of 
the Fair Housing Act. Hughes, 915 F.2d at 546-47. The defendant argued that the Act 
did not apply. The Hughes court determined that the religious organization exemption was 
not at issue in that case because the defendant was a non-sectarian institution open to 
children of all creeds, and the religious exemption was therefore "inapplicable by its 
terms." Id. at 550. This is arguably not an interpretation of the exemption. The Hughes 
court did not address any issue regarding the exemption other than whether it could apply 
to a non-sectarian organization. 
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lics.1O This admitted religious discrimination would violate the Fair 
Housing Act, unless the Columbus Country Club (the "Club") was 
"controlled by" or "operated in conjunction with" the Catholic 
Church (the "Church") so as to fit within the Act's exemption. ll The 
Church had granted permission for mass to be heard on the grounds of 
the Club, arranged for a local priest to celebrate the mass, and tacitly 
approved recital of the rosary on Club grounds, but had no additional 
connections with the Club. 12 
The majority and dissent held conflicting views regarding the in­
terpretation of the exemption as it applied to the Club. The majority 
ruled that the exemption should be construed narrowly, and held that, 
because there was no formal relationship between the Club and the 
Church, the exemption did not apply.13 The dissent urged a broader 
reading of the exemption, and stated that a fuller examination of both 
the Club's purposes and its connection with the Church would show 
that the Club did fit within the exemption. 14 
Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion examined the 
constitutional implications of their conclusions. IS Moreover, they 
failed to examine the interpretation of religious organization exemp­
tions in any other statute to lend support to their conclusions. Case 
law exists that deals with the interpretation of the religious organiza­
tion exemption contained in Title VII, the employment discrimination 
provision of the Civil Rights Act of 196416 ("Title VII"). Further­
more, some state housing acts have religious organization exemp­
tions. 17 The Title VII and state housing act exemptions are similar in 
many ways to the Fair Housing Act's exemption. The Columbus 
Country Club court could have looked to case law interpreting these 
exemptions for guidance. This Note discusses why and how the court 
could have used constitutional principles, Title VII case law, and state 
10. As alleged in the complaint filed in federal district court by the United States 
Department of Justice, the Columbus Country Club (the "Club") may also have discrimi­
nated based on sex and on a person's protest against the Club's allegedly unlawful prac­
tices. See infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text. 
11. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 883. 
12. Id. at 879. 
13. Id. at 883. 
14. Id. at 885-88 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
15. The majority stated that it would not address these arguments because the dis­
trict court had not done so. Id. at 885. On remand, the district court did address these 
constitutional issues. See infra notes 226-42 and accompanying text. 
16. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 702, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988». See infra note 147 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
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case law to aid in its interpretation of the religious organization ex­
emption contained in the Fair Housing Act. 
Part I of this Note discusses relevant constitutional considera­
tions18 and the legislative history of the Fair Housing Act. Part II 
examines United States v. Columbus Country Club 19 and focuses on 
the reasoning of both the majority and the dissent with regard to the 
interpretation of the Act's religious organization exemption. Part III 
addresses case law that sets out standards governing the application of 
Title VII's religious organization exemption and a similar state fair 
housing act. 20 All of the cases discussed in Part III set forth various 
standards to determine the extent of an entity's affiliation or connec­
tion with a religious organization.21 Part IV considers whether any 
one, or a combination, of the Title VII standards and state housing 
law standards would apply equally well to interpret the Fair Housing 
Act's religious organization exemption. Part IV also examines 
whether the First Amendment's Establishment and/or Free Exercise 
Clauses22 require an outcome different from that reached in the princi­
pal case. 
The Note concludes by arguing that the decision reached in Co­
lumbus Country Club was correct, but the factors underlying the ap­
plication of the Title VII exemption and the state fair housing law 
exemption would have provided a better basis for that decision. These 
factors should be considered in future applications of the Act's reli­
gious organization· exemption. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Relevant Constitutional Principles 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of reli­
gion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."23 The First Amend­
18. The Club, in its Petition for Rehearing En Banc and Petition for Writ of Certio­
rari to the United States Supreme Court, alleged that the majority's decision violated the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses contained in the First Amendment to the Consti­
tution. Both of these petitions were denied. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 888 
(3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991). See infra notes 229-42 and accompa­
nying text for the district court's treatment of these issues on remand. 
19. 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2797 (1991). 
20. See infra note 180 for the text of New York's fair housing law's religious organi­
zation exemption. 
21. See infra notes 154-85 and accompanying text. 
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
23. [d. 
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ment's "religion clauses,"24 as the foregoing language is called, are 
necessary to preserve religious organizations' and individuals' rights to 
be free from governmental interference with their religious practices 
and beliefs.25 Thus, the Constitution requires statutes such as the Fair 
Housing Act to contain some sort of exemption for religious organiza­
tions. Otherwise, religious institutions would not be free to limit their 
membership or assistance to persons of their own religion. 
The Establishment Clause only requires that the government not 
enact a law "respecting an establishment of religion."26 Courts have 
interpreted this phrase to mean that, at the very least, the government 
may not "coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its 
exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion 
or religious faith, or tends to do so.' "27 Furthermore, the government 
may not "obtrude itself in the internal affairs of any religious institu­
tion."28 However, Congress does exactly the opposite of intruding 
into religious organizations' affairs when it exempts those organiza­
tions from the provisions of certain statutes. These exemptions "al­
leviat[e] significant governmental interference with the ability of 
religious organizations to define and carry out their religious mis­
sions."29 Thus, in certain areas, religious institutions are free to dis­
criminate on religious grounds.30 However, groups which are not 
religious may not do so. The Supreme Court has stated that "freedom 
of religion, like freedom from race discrimination and freedom of 
speech [is] a 'constitutional norm.' "31 While the Constitution does 
not prohibit private discrimination, Congress has done so in various 
federal laws.32 
The Establishment Clause limits the government's ability to inter­
fere with peoples' religious beliefs and practices. The Free Exercise 
Clause accomplishes a similar goal.33 However, under the Free Exer­
24. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2652, 2656 (1992). 
25. "[T]he central meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment ... is 
that all creeds must be tolerated and none favored." Id. at 2657. 
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
27. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,678 (1984». 
28. Id. at 2661-62 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
29. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987). 
30. See infra notes 57, 147. 
31. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901 
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
32. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973). 
33. The two clauses must be read together. The government may accommodate the 
free expression of religious beliefs, but this principle cannot take precedence over the limi­
tations of the Establishment Clause, which provides that the government may not promote 
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cise Clause, individuals' or groups' religious beliefs do not always ex­
cuse them from complying with "an otherwise valid law prohibiting 
conduct that the State is free to regulate. "34 As long as a statute 
prohibiting certain conduct is "generally applicable and otherwise 
valid,"3s is not "specifically directed to religious practice,"36 and is 
"otherwise constitutional as applied to those who engage in the spe­
cific act for nonreligious reasons,"37 persons or groups will be excused 
from compliance on free exercise grounds only if they meet the test set 
out in Sherbert v. Verner. 38 That test requires that parties seeking 
exemption from such a statute show that the infringement of their free 
exercise right is substantial and that the government has no compel­
ling interest in regulating the conduct at issue.39 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the Sherbert test, 
which balances the nature of the infringement upon the individual's 
free exercise rights against the nature of the government's interest, 
should not be employed in every case involving a free exercise chal­
lenge.4O For example, the Court has declined to use this test in cases 
involving a free exercise challenge to an "across-the-board criminal 
prohibition on a particular form of conduct."41 
In order to evaluate the viability of an Establishment Clause or 
Free Exercise Clause challenge to the Columbus Country Club 42 ma-
religion. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992). See also Jonathan E. Nuechter­
lein, Note, The Free Exercise Boundaries ofPermissible Accommodation Under the Estab­
lishment Clause, 99 YALE L.J. 1127 (1990). See infra notes 223-68 and accompanying text. 
34. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79 (holding denial of unemployment benefits to persons 
who were fired from their jobs at a drug rehabilitation clinic after having ingested peyote as 
part of a ceremony at a Native American Church, of which both were members, did not 
violate employees' free exercise rights). 
35. [d. at 878. 
36. [d. at 872. 
37. [d. 
38. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
39. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07. See also Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 
I, 18-19 (1989); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
40. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-85. The Court in Smith noted that the Sherbert test had 
only been used in cases where a claimant protested that denial of unemployment compensa­
tion infringed upon his free exercise rights. While the Smith Court did not foreclose the 
use of the Sherbert balancing test in any other situation, it stated that even if it were to use 
the test outside of an unemployment compensation context, it would still be inapplicable to 
a free exercise challenge to an "across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form 
of conduct." [d. at 884-85 (emphasis added). 
41. [d. For a discussion of other instances in which a court should not engage in a 
Sherbert balancing test, see infra note 266 and accompanying text. 
42. United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, III S. Ct. 2797 (1991). 
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jority's interpretation of the Fair Housing Act's religious organization 
exemption, it is necessary to understand the Act itself and its effect on 
a group such as the Columbus Country Club. 
B. The Fair Housing Act 
The Fair Housing Act was a continuation of several years of con­
gressional effort to improve the status of minorities, particularly Afri­
can-Americans.43 In 1963, members of Congress, as well as President 
Kennedy, submitted numerous bills in an attempt to end various types 
of discrimination on a national scale.44 When the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 was passed, it prohibited discrimination in several areas on the 
basis of race, color, religion, and national origin, but it did not contain 
any provisions relating to discrimination in housing.45 
The first congressional attempt to eliminate discrimination in the 
sale or rental of housing occurred in 1966.46 The suggested housing 
discrimination statute was part of the proposed Civil Rights Act of 
1966.47 
The religious organization and private club exemptions had origi­
nally been proposed by the House JUdiciary Committee.48 By August 
3, 1966, the initial form of the religious organization and private club 
43. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1964 u.S.C.C.A.N. 
2355,2391-93. The House Report indicated Congress' desire to ameliorate the discrimina­
tory situations with which most minorities were faced. 
Considerable progress has been made in eliminating discrimination in many areas 
because of local initiative either in the form of State laws and local ordinances or 
as the result of voluntary action. Nevertheless, in the last decade it has become 
increasingly clear that progress has been too slow and that national legislation is 
required to meet a national need which becomes ever more obvious. That need is 
evidenced, on the one hand, by a growing impatience by the victims of discrimi­
nation with its continuance and, on the other hand, by a growing recognition on 
the part of all of our people of the incompatibility of such discrimination with our 
ideals and the principles to which this country is dedicated. 
Id. at 2393. 
44. [d. at 2391-92. 
45. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion and national origin in the following areas: voting rights, places of public 
accommodation, public education, federally assisted programs, and employment. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243-47, 252-54, 266-68 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-h (1988». 
46. H.R. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d. Sess., 112 CoNG. REc. 18,112 (1966). 
47. The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1966 was never enacted. See infra text accom­
panying note 54. 
48. In 1966, the House Judiciary Committee spent nine executive sessions devoted 
primarily to revising Title IV (the fair housing section of the proposed Civil Rights Act of 
1966). Changes were, for the most part, in areas of coverage and enforcement. Most of the 
changes were apparently intended to limit the scope of Title IV. 112 CONGo REc. 22,131 
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exemption language already existed.49 In the 1966 version, private or 
fraternal organizations were mentioned in the same sentence with, and 
treated in the same manner as, religious institutions. The proposed 
1966 language exempted a religious, private, or fraternal organization 
that made discriminatory selections based on religion in an effort to 
promote the organization's "religious principles or the aims, purposes, 
or fraternal principles for which it is established or maintained. "SO 
The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1966, as a whole, caused con­
siderable debate. The controversy centered primarily around the fair 
housing provision and the section that prescribed penalties for certain 
racially motivated acts of violence. 51 The proposed fair housing sec­
tion was known to its foes as the "open housing"S2 provision of the 
Act. Opponents contended that this provision was an attempt to elim­
inate the free alienability of property and was therefore unconstitu­
tional.S3 The 1966 attempt to enact a fair housing statute, as well as 
attempts in 1967, failed. 54 In fact, the Fair Housing Act was not 
passed by both houses of Congress until April, 1968, four days after 
(1966) (remarks of Senator Thurmond). One such change was the forerunner of the pres­
ent religious organization exemption. 
The Legislative Reference Service discussed the exemptions in pertinent part as 
follows: 
Section 403 of the Committee bill carves out two other new exemptions . . .. The 
second exemption permits any religious or denominational institution, or any 
charitable or educational institution or organization which is operated, super­
vised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, or any 
bona fide private or fraternal organization, to give preference to persons of the 
same religion or denomination, or to members of such private or fraternal organi­
zation, or to make such selection as is calculated to promote the religious princi­
ples or the aims, purposes for which it is established or maintained. Similar 
exemptions are found in many state open occupancy laws and presumably this 
experience may be relied upon in borderline cases. 
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ANALYSIS OF CHANGES 
MADE IN TITLE IV BY HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMfITEE, 112 CONGo REC. 22,133 (1966). 
49. See infra note 57 for the text of the 1966 proposed exemption. 
50. 112 CONGo REC. 18,112 (1966) (emphasis added) (Reading of Title IV, Civil 
Rights Act of 1966, H.R. 14765). See infra note 57 for the full text of the proposed 1966 
exemption. 
51. 112 CONGo REC. 17,111, 17,179, 17,479, 17,580, 17,751, 17,831, 18,104, 18,171, 
18,394,18,455, 18,700 (1966); 114 CONGo REC. 9,528-620 (1966). 
52. 114 CONGo REC. 9,528 (1966). 
53. One opponent remarked, "If this bill were to be passed, the Constitutional right 
... of an individual to purchase, own, dispose of and enjoy property as he sees fit would be 
denied." 112 CONGo REc. 22,130 (1966) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond). 
54. 112 CONGo REc. 22,719, 22,792, 23,019, 23,043 (1966). Fair housing provisions 
were debated in the House of Representatives but not voted upon in 1967. 113 CONGo REC. 
17,975 (reporting the bill out on June 29, 1967). The House also debated the fair housing 
legislation in the context of a debate concerning project sites for the Atomic Energy Com­
mission. 113 CoNG. REC. 19,715 (1967). 
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the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.55 
As enacted, the "aims, purposes or fraternal principles" language 
of the 1966 version was omitted, and the exemption was divided into 
two parts: first, it addressed religious organizations or entities con­
trolled by or operated in conjunction with them; and second, it ad­
dressed private clubs. The 1968 version treated these two types of 
organizations differently. A private club could limit the rental or oc­
cupancy of its lodgings. A religious organization, or an organization 
operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a reli­
gious organization, could limit the sale, rental, or occupancy of its 
dwellings. 56 
The Fair Housing Act, as finally enacted, bears a great deal of 
resemblance to the fair housing sections that were originally part of 
the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1966.57 Therefore, although the leg­
55. The Fair Housing Act was passed by the Senate on March II, 1968 as part ofthe 
Civil Rights Act of 1968. 114 CoNG. REc. 5,992 (1968). It was passed by the House of 
Representatives on April 10, 1968. 114 CoNG. REc. 9,621 (1968). See, e.g., ROBERT G. 
ScHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW & LITIGATION § 5.2 (1990). 
56. 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1988). See infra note 57 for the fuJI text of the exemption as 
enacted. The Fair Housing Act was amended in 1988. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, Pub. L. No. 
100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988). Those amendments are not significant for purposes of this 
Note. The portions amended were §§ 3602, 3604-08, 3615-19, and 3631. Although 
§ 3607, the religious organization and private club exemption, was amended, none of the 
language pertaining to religious organizations or private clubs was changed. The amend­
ment consisted solely ofthe addition oflanguage regarding maximum occupancy and hous­
ing for the elderly. 
On February 6, 1968, prior to the final passage into law of the Fair Housing Act, a 
series of questions and answers was read into the record after the Senate's approval of the 
latest amendments to the Act. In response to a question regarding what exemptions were 
now contained in the Act, Senator MondaJe's response was, "There is an exemption to 
permit religious institutions or schools, etc., affiliated with them, to give preference in hous­
ing to persons of their own religion despite the Act." 114 CONGo REc. 2,273 (1968); United 
States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 882 (3d Cir. 1990). 
57. "H.R. 2516 as reported closely resembles Title IV of the proposed Civil Rights 
Act of 1966." S. REp. No. 721, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1838. 
In 1966, the proposed exemption was as follows: 
(c) Nothing in this section shall bar any religious or denominational institution, 
or any charitable or educational institution or organization which is operated, 
supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, or any 
bona fide private or fraternal organization, from giving preference to persons of 
the same religion or denomination, or to members of such private or fraternal 
organization, or from making such selection as is calculated by such organization 
to promote the religious principles or the aims, purposes, or fraternal principles 
for which it is established or maintained. 
112 CONGo REC. 18,112 (1966) (Reading of Title IV, Civil Rights Act of 1966, H.R. 
14765). 
Section 807, the religious organization/private club exemption, as enacted, provided as 
follows: 
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islative history of the Fair Housing Act has been referred to as "lim­
ited"S8 or "sketchy,"S9 the foregoing examination of the proposed 
1966 Act's housing provisions is fruitful because those sections were 
incorporated, with some changes, into the 1968 version of the Fair 
Housing Act. 60 
Although the religious organization exemption enacted in 1968 is 
somewhat different from the 1966 version, the language crucial to the 
Columbus Country Club decision was present in both the proposed 
1966 Act and the 1968 Act.61 The issue addressed by the Columbus 
Country Club court was whether the Club was "controlled by" or "op­
erated in conjunction with" a religious organization so as to fall within 
the exemption's scope.62 The majority found that the language of the 
exemption should be interpreted to require a formal, mutual relation­
ship between a church and an entity seeking exempt statuS.63 The 
(a) Nothing in this title shall prohibit a religious organization, association, or 
society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or con­
trolled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society, 
from limiting the sale, rental or occupancy of dwellings which it owns or operates 
for other than a commercial purpose to persons of the same religion, or from 
giving preference to such persons, unless membership in such religion is restricted 
on account of race, color, or national origin. Nor shall anything in this title pro­
hibit a private club not in fact open to the public, which as an incident to its 
primary purpose or purposes provides lodgings which it owns or operates for 
other than a commercial purpose, from limiting the rental or occupancy of such 
lodgings to its members or from giving preference to its members. 
Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 807, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81, reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 102 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1988». The current § 3607 
substitutes the word "subchapter" for the word "title." 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1988). 
58. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 882. 
59. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 1977), em. denied, 
435 U.S. 908 (1978). 
60. The courts that have considered the Act's legislative history have looked to the 
1968 history, not the 1966 history. They have therefore concluded that no reports are 
available regarding the Act, and that the legislation was essentially passed as submitted. 
Thus, the Columbus Country Club court stated that "[s]ince [the Fair Housing Act] was 
enacted with only minimal changes from the way it was first introduced by Senator Dirksen 
on the floor of the Senate, its legislative history does not include the committee reports and 
other documents that usually accompany major legislation." Columbus Country Club, 915 
F.2d at 882 n.3 (referring to Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147 n.29). 
While some legislative history is available concerning the 1968 version of the Act it­
self, the record is almost bare as to the intent behind the 1968 version of the religious 
organization exemption contained in § 3607 of the Fair Housing Act. See supra notes 50­
53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1966 version of the exemption. 
61. The majority and dissent agreed that the crucial determination was whether the 
Club was "operated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organi­
zation." Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 882. See infra notes 104-06 and accompa­
nying text. 
62. See supra note 57 for the text of the exemption. 
63. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 883. 
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court held that the Club was not exempt from the Act's provisions 
because the pertinent facts did not show such a formal, mutual rela­
tionship between the Club and the Church.64 
II. UNITED STATES V. COLUMBUS COUNTRY CLUB 65 
A. Facts 
The Tri-Council Country Club, later known as the Columbus 
Country Club, was established near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 
1920 by the Knights of Columbus, an organization with close ties to 
the Roman Catholic Church.66 "Annual" membership67 was origi­
nally limited to persons who were members of the Knights of Colum­
bus. Membership in the Knights of Columbus was limited to Roman 
Catholic males.68 
The Club's original charter stated that the Club's purpose was to 
provide for "social enjoyments, in order to cultivate cordial relations 
and sentiments of friendship among its members and provide accom­
modations for social intercourse, outdoor sport, and healthful recrea­
tion."69 The Club's official history characterized the Club as a 
"Catholic organization" and a "vacation group."70 However, it had 
no formal or legal connection with the Catholic Church,?l 
Title to the land on which the Club was situated was originally 
held by a nonprofit corporation called the "Tri-Council of the Knights 
of Columbus."72 The Club grounds, consisting of approximately 
64. Id. 
65. 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991). 
66. Id. at 878-79. 
67. Voting rights and ownership of summer bungalows located on the club's grounds 
were restricted to "annual" members. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 879. "Associ­
ate" or "social" members were usually relatives or friends of annual members. They did 
not have the same rights as "annual" members and were not required to be either male or 
Roman Catholic. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. United States v. Columbus Country Club, No. 87-8164, 1989 WL 149935 at *5 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 6,1989). These facts were set out in the opinion of the district court, which 
decided in favor of the Club upon its motion for summary judgment. The district court 
examined certain facts in greater detail than did the Third Circuit majority. The Third 
Circuit dissent relied more heavily on facts set out in the district court's opinion than did 
the majority. 
71. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 879. 
72. Columbus Country Club, 1989 WL 149935 at *1. The Club had retained its non­
profit status and was exempt from federal income taxation. Interestingly, the Club was not 
exempt under the Internal Revenue Code provision that exempts religious organizations. 
261.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1988). It was exempt under the provision applicable to clubs "organ­
ized for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes." 26 I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) 
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twenty-three acres of land, contained a chapel, a grotto, a club house, 
and various recreational facilities and summer cottages.73 Annual 
members were allowed to erect summer cottages on Club grounds at 
their own expense. The cottages were owned by the members who 
constructed them, although the Club's members collectively owned 
the land on which the cottages stood.74 A cottage could be sold or 
transferred by testamentary disposition, but only with the Club's per­
mission.7s Since only male Roman Catholics were allowed to become 
annual members, and since only annual members could own cottages, 
the cottages could only be passed to male Roman Catholics.76 
Because the Club was comprised largely of Roman Catholics, 
members desired that certain religious ceremonies be conducted on 
Club grounds. For instance, Club members had always recited the 
rosary on Club grounds.77 In 1922, the Archbishop of Philadelphia 
gave the Club "special permission for the celebration of mass" on the 
Club's premises every Sunday throughout the summer.7S The Arch­
bishop also provided for a priest to celebrate the mass.79 
Mrs. Anita Gualteri, an associate member of the Club, attempted 
to become an annual member in 1986, because she wished to purchase 
the leasehold on a summer cottage on Club grounds that had previ­
ously belonged to her father. 80 The Club initially denied Mrs. 
Gualteri permission to purchase the leasehold because she was a wo­
(1988). See Brief for the Appellee, Columbus Country Club at 11 n.5, United States v. 
Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1196), cert. denied, 111 S. 
Ct. 2797 (1991). 
73. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 879. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. The Club's charter was amended in 
1922, pursuant to a reorganization ofthe Club due to certain financial difficulties. Its name 
was changed to Columbus Country Club, and annual members were no longer required to 
be affiliated with the Knights of Columbus. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 879. 
However, annual membership was still restricted to Roman Catholic males. That restric­
tion continued until 1987. Id. at 879 n.l. In 1987, the Club began to allow women to 
become annual members, but they were still required to be Roman Catholics. Id. at 880. 
77. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 879. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 879 & n.2. Mrs. Gualteri's father had died, and the leasehold had passed 
to his wife, Mrs. Gualteri's mother. Because she was a woman, Mrs. Gualteri's mother was 
not entitled to annual membership in the Club, but she was able to retain her husband's 
leasehold interest in the property. Id. at 879. She wished to sell the leasehold interest to 
her daughter. However, the Club informed Mrs. Gualteri that she could not purchase the 
cottage because, as a woman, she was ineligible for annual membership. Id. at 879-80. Her 
husband was not eligible for annual membership because he was not a Roman Catholic. 
Id. at 880. 
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8lman. She complained to the Cardinal's Commission on Human 
Rights and Urban Ministry. The Archdiocese, after investigating Mrs. 
Gualteri's allegations, threatened to withdraw its permission for 
weekly mass at the Club unless the Club discontinued its practice of 
excluding women from annual membership.82 The Club then altered 
its bylaws to allow women to become annual members.83 It also added 
other provisions to the bylaws at this time. Previously, the Club's by­
laws had not specifically mentioned any requirement of members' affil­
iation with the Roman Catholic Church, although it had always been 
the Club's policy to require such affiliation in practice.84 In 1987, 
however, the "Purpose" section of the bylaws was amended to require 
that any prospective member obtain a written statement from his or 
her parish priest concerning the applicant's good standing in the Ro­
man Catholic Church. 85 This section also mentioned, for the first 
time, the importance of the religious aspects of the Club.86 Both of 
these facts had previously been recognized by the Club and were ob­
served in practice. However, they had never expressly been set out in 
any Club document prior to 1987.87 
After the bylaws had been amended to allow women to apply, 
Mrs. Gualteri applied again for annual membership, and was again 
denied.88 The Board of Governors' stated reason for the denial was 
the Gualteri family's "demonstrated lack of ability to get along with 
the community and lack of interest in the religious aspects of the com­
munity."89 Mrs. Gualteri apparently believed that the denial was re­
taliatory in nature and that it was based on her complaints to the 
Church authorities about the Club's previous gender-based discrimi­
nation.90 She notified the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Divi­
sion, which eventually filed a civil suit against the Club in federal 
court, alleging a pattern and practice of discrimination based upon sex 
81. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 880. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 879. 
85. Id. at 880. 
86. Id. The Club's position was that the bylaws were amended to formally reflect its 
religious "mission," which had existed since the Club's inception. Brief for the Appellee, 
Columbus Country Club at 11 n.4, United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877 
(3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1196), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2797 (1991). 
87. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 879. 
88. Id. at 880. 
89. Id. 
90. Columbus Country Club, 1989 WL 149935 at *2. 
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and upon religion, both in violation of the Fair Housing Act.91 
In response to the government's complaint, the Club did not deny 
that it discriminated on the basis of religion.92 Instead, the Club ar­
gued that the Fair Housing Act did not apply for two reasons: first, it 
argued that it fit within the Act's private club exemption, and the cot­
tages were not "dwellings" for purposes of the Act; second, it asserted 
that even if the cottages were "dwellings," it fit within the Act's reli­
gious organization exemption.93 
The Club moved for summary judgment, and the district court 
held that although the cottages were "dwellings" for purposes of the 
Act, the Club did fall within both the religious organization and pri­
vate club exemptions.94 Because the district court held that the Club 
was exempt from the Act, the Club could discriminate against Mrs. 
Gualteri on the basis of religion without violating federal law. 
B. The Third Circuit's Treatment of the Case 
The government appealed from the district court's decision. On 
appeal, the Club argued that it fit within the religious organization 
exemption because, while it was not itself a "religious organization," it 
was "affiliated with" or "operated in conjunction with" the Catholic 
Church.9s The Club alleged that it was in fact directly affiliated with, 
or operated in conjunction with, the Archdiocese because of its reli­
gious activities, which the Archdiocese permitted.96 The Club con­
tended that the dictionary meaning of the words "in conjunction 
with" included any type of relationship between the religious organi­
zation and the entity seeking to benefit from the exemption.97 The 
Club asserted that, even though the Church did not require it to carry 
on any particular activities, the fact that the Church had specifically 
91. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 880. Section 3614 of the Fair Housing Act 
provides as follows: 
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person 
or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full 
enjoyment of any of the rights granted by this subchapter, or that any group of 
persons has been denied any of the rights granted by this subchapter and such 
denial raises an issue of general public importance, the Attorney General may 
commence a civil action in any appropriate United States district court. 
42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (1988). 
92. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 880. 
93. Id. at 880-82. 
94. Id. at 880. 
95. Id. at 882. 
96. Id. at 882-83. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79 for a discussion of the 
Club's religious activities. 
97. Id. at 883. 
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permitted the Club to hold mass on Club grounds meant that it was 
operated "in conjunction with" the Church according to the plain 
meaning of that phrase.98 The Club argued that this conclusion was 
required by a broad interpretation of the exemption's language, which 
itself was required by Congress' "sensitivity to first amendment 
rights."99 
The Third Circuit did not agree. loo It held that the Club did not 
meet the standards for inclusion in either the religious organization 
exemption or the private club exemption. 101 The majority found that 
the Club did not fall within the religious organization exemption be­
cause there was no formal or mutual relationship between the Club 
and the Church, and therefore, the Club was neither controlled by nor 
operated in conjunction with the Church. 102 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 882-83. 
100. The case was heard by a three member panel of the Third Circuit. Id. at 878. 
The panel consisted of Justices Mansmann, Greenberg, and Seitz. The Third Circuit de­
nied the Club's petition for rehearing en banc on December 18, 1990 by a 7-5 vote. Id. at 
888. 
101. Id. at 883, 885. The court held that for an organization to fall within the pri­
vate club exemption five conditions must be met: 
The defendant must (1) be a "private club not in fact open to the public"; (2) 
provide "lodgings"; and (3) only limit the "rental or occupancy of such lodg­
ings." Furthermore, if a defendant provides "lodgings," those lodgings must be: 
(4) provided "as an incident to its primary purpose or purposes"; and (5) owned 
or operated "for other than a commercial purpose." 
Id. at 884. 
The majority found (and the dissent did not disagree) that the United States' interpre­
tation of the private club exemption was correct. The United States had argued that even 
though the Club was private and not in fact open to the public, it did not provide "lodg­
ings" because the bungalows were not temporary accommodations, but summer residences. 
Id. at 884-85. The court held that "lodgings" refers to temporary accommodations, 
whereas "dwellings" refers to more permanent, long-term accommodations. Id. In exam­
ining the private club exemption's legislative history, the majority found that Congress had 
expressly replaced the word "dwellings" with the word "lodgings." The court found that 
Congress made this replacement in order to limit the private club exemption's scope. Id. 
The court further noted that, in the process of amending the private club exemption, 
when Congress substituted the word "lodgings" for the word "dwellings," it also deleted 
the word "sale" from the private club exemption, leaving only the words "rental or occu­
pancy." Id. at 885. Notwithstanding the Club's argument that by limiting the sale of the 
bungalows it was also limiting their occupancy, the majority held that the defendant's pol­
icy or practice fell outside the plain language of the statutory exemption. Id. 
102. Id. at 882-83. 
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1. 	 The Majority's Interpretation Of The Religious 

Organization Exemption 103 

Since the Club did not contend it was a religious organization, 104 
it needed to prove it was a "nonprofit organization 'operated, super­
vised or controlled by or in conjunction with' a religious organiza­
tion." lOS Perhaps because the Club was not owned, supervised, or 
controlled by the Church, all parties agreed that the crucial question 
was whether the Club was" 'operated, supervised or controlled ... in 
conjunction with a religious organization.' "106 The majority agreed 
with the government's contention that an entity must have a formal, 
mutual relationship with the religious organization in question in or­
der for the exemption to apply.IO' 
The majority disagreed with the Club's suggestion that the ex­
emption's language should be read broadly. It held that because the 
Fair Housing Act's purpose was remedial, the Act as a whole must be 
given a broad interpretation,108 and therefore, as a logical corollary, 
103. The majority opinion was written by Judge Seitz, and was joined by Judge 
Greenberg. [d. at 877. 
104. The Club argued before the district court, in its Petition for Rehearing En Bane, 
and in its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, that it was a 
"religious organization" within the plain meaning of that phrase. The district court re­
jected this argument. Columbus Country Club, 1989 WL 149935 at ·5. The Third Circuit 
apparently did not consider this argument. 
105. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 882 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (1988». 
See supra note 57 for the text of the exemption. 
106. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 882 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (1988». 
107. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 883. 
108. [d. at 882-83. As support for its position that the Act as a whole should be read 
broadly, the majority cited Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) 
and Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 435 U.S. 
908 (1978). 
The TrajJicante Court focused its decision upon the meaning and scope of a "person 
aggrieved" who is entitled to file a private lawsuit under the Act. At the time of the 
TrajJicante action, § 81O(a) of the Act provided that the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development ("HUD") could investigate complaints filed with it by "persons aggrieved" 
by discriminatory procedures that have occurred or are about to occur. TrajJicante, 409 
U.S. at 208. Section 81O(c) provided that HUD was required to refer the complaint to the 
appropriate state agency. Id. at 207 n.3. The state agency was unable to proceed against 
the defendants, and referred the complaints back to HUD. !d. at 207. Section 81O(d) of 
the Act provided that if HUD failed to obtain the offending party's voluntary compliance 
within 30 days, the "aggrieved person" could sue in the appropriate district court. [d. at 
208-09; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610-14 (1988). 
In TrajJicante, two residents of an apartment complex had sued under the Act, alleg­
ing that the landlord's discrimination against other persons had injured the plaintiffs. Traf­
./icante, 409 U.S. at 206-08. The court of appeals had dismissed the complaint, holding that 
only persons who have actually been discriminated against are "persons aggrieved" under 
the Act. [d. at 208. The Supreme Court reversed. It found that "the language of the Act 
is broad and inclusive," and that Congress had considered fair housing to be "of the highest 
1993] UNITED STATES v. COLUMBUS COUNTRY CLUB 77 
any exemptions to the Act must be narrowly construed. I09 Accord­
ingly, the court held that the meaning of the phrase "in conjunction 
with" in the exemption must also be construed narrowly.llo The 
court stated that a narrow construction of the words "in conjunction 
with" would require that a mutual relationship exist between the 
Church and the Club in order for the exemption to apply.lll 
The court held that the relationship between the Club and 
Church could not be viewed only from the ,Club's perspective. It 
noted that the Club benefitted from the relationship because the 
Church made a priest available and granted permission for mass to be 
held on Club grounds every Sunday during the summer. I 12 However, 
priority." Id. at 209-11. The Court held that since HUD had no power to enforce the Act, 
and since the Attorney General could only institute a suit in a "pattern or practice" situa­
tion, suits by private individuals were the primary means of enforcement of the Act. Id. at 
210 -11. The Court held that "We can give vitality to [the section defining 'persons ag­
grieved'] only by a generous construction which gives standing to sue to all in the same 
housing unit who are injured." Id. at 212. The Court based its determination in part upon 
an examination of the standing provisions of Title VII contained in Hackett v. McGuire 
Bros., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971). Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209. 
The Columbus Country Club majority also cited the Third Circuit's decision in Resi­
dent Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977). In Rizzo, the Third Circuit held 
that "the stated Congressional purpose demands a generous construction of Title VIII," 
and went on to note that the United States Supreme Court had held that both Title VIII 
and Title VII should be construed "broadly so as to end discrimination." Id. at 147 (citing 
Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211). 
Both the Rizzo court and the Trafficante Court found that the Fair Housing Act and 
Title VII (the employment discrimination section) of the Civil Rights Act of 1966 were so 
similar as to make comparisons between their provisions desirable, at least as far as inter­
preting the two statutes' standards with respect to a plaintiff's standing to sue and a de­
fendant's rebuttal of a showing of a prima facie case by the plaintiff. Rizzo, 546 F.2d at 
148; Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209. 
The court in United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980), 
aff'd. in part and rev'd in part, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 
(1982), also held that the Fair Housing Act should be construed broadly. "The Act ... is 
to be construed generously to ensure the prompt and effective elimination of all trllces of 
discrimination within the housing field." Id. at 1053. 
109. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 883 (citing United States v. Hughes Me­
morial Home, 396 F. Supp. 544, 550 (W.D. Va. 1975». The Hughes court, while not spe­
cifically addressing the religious organization exemption, characterized it as "limited." 
Hughes, 396 F. Supp. at 550. See supra note 9. 
110. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 883. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. The Club asserted that this privilege was "rare and unusual," because the 
Club was the only community of its kind to have ever been granted permission for masses 
to be said outside a church on a regular basis. The Club alleged that since the privilege was 
rare and unusual, this was evidence of its mutual relationship with the Church. Brief for 
the Appellee, Columbus Country Club, at 3, United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 
F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1196), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991). However, it is 
equally arguable that if few other groups had been granted such a privilege, then this type 
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the court held that since the Club did little or nothing in return for 
these privileges, no mutual relationship between the Club and the 
Church existed.l13 
The majority further found that the Church's ability to withdraw 
its permission to hold mass on Club grounds1l4 was not enough, by 
itself, to hold that the Club was operated in conjunction with the 
Church. lls The court held that evidence pertaining to the Club's 
holding mass was proof of the Club's "unilateral activities," but did 
not show a mutual relationship between it and the Church. 1l6 The 
court stated that evidence of such unilateral activities would be rele­
vant to determine whether the Club was a religious organization, but 
was not relevant to determine whether it was operated in conjunction 
with one. 1l7 
2. 	 The Dissent's Interpretation of the Religious Organization 
Exemption118 
The only point of difference between the majority and dissenting 
opinions concerned the proper interpretation of the religious organiza­
tion exemption, and specifically, the proper interpretation of the terms 
"controlled by" and "operated in conjunction with" contained in the 
exemption. The dissent asserted that the Club was "controlled by" or 
"operated in conjunction with" a religious organization so as to fall 
within the exemption's ambit. 1l9 The dissenting judge first contended 
that no case law had interpreted the exemption. 120 Since she also 
found the legislative history to be "equivocal" as it related to the ex-
of privilege was not one that the Church would nonnally think of as creating any kind of 
"relationship. " 
113. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 883. 
114. See supra text accompanying note 82. 
115. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 883. Because the case was before the 
Third Circuit on the government's appeal from the lower court's grant of the Club's motion 
for summary judgment, the court was only concerned with whether the facts, as presented 
by the Club in support of its motion, were sufficient to hold that it fell within the exemption 
as a matter of law. Id. at 885. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Judge Mansmann dissented from the majority of the three-judge panel. 
Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 885. 
119. Id. at 885-88 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
120. Id. at 885, 886 & n.l. See supra note 9. The United States District Court for 
the Western District of Virginia did address the exemption in a limited context in United 
States v. Hughes Memorial Home, 396 F. Supp. 544 (W.O. Va. 1975). However, the Co­
lumbus Country Club dissent did not seem to think that the Hughes court had actually 
interpreted the exemption. 
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emption,121 she stated that any analysis of the exemption must be 
based upon two factors: the statutory language and the facts of the 
case. 122 
After examining the statutory language, the dissent determined 
that Congress had not intended courts to construe the religious organi­
zation exemption narrowly. 123 In support of this position, the dissent 
referred to Congress' use of the disjunctive form, as opposed to the 
conjunctive form, in the exemption's language. The dissent's position 
was that the congressional intent was to exempt any organization 
"that is 'operated by' or 'supervised by' or 'controlled by' or 'operated 
in conjunction with' or 'controlled in conjunction with' a religious 
organization." 124 
The dissenting judge also disagreed with the majority's position 
that the words "in conjunction with" must be construed as requiring a 
mutual relationship between the Church and the Club. She stated that 
"[i]f Congress had meant to make control or mutuality the determina­
tive evaluative criterion, it certainly would have expressed this inten­
tion more clearly."125 According to the dissent, statutory language 
can only be construed differently from the meaning commonly attrib­
uted to it in two circumstances: if the contrary appears from an exam­
ination of the legislative history, or if case law has established an 
alternative meaning. 126 The dissenting judge concluded that since the 
121. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 887. 
122. Id. at 886. 
123. Id. at 885. See supra note 109 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
majority's contrary conclusion. 
124. Id. at 887 (emphasis added). The dissent's characterization of the statutory 
language as disjunctive does not seem to comport with the actual words found in the stat­
ute. While the dissent stated that the exemption used the disjunctive fonn, the statutory 
language itself is not actually as disjunctive as the language set out in the dissenting opin­
ion. The exemption in fact provides that an organization will be exempted if it is "oper­
ated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization or 
society." 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1988). For the text of the entire exemption, see supra note 57. 
125. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 887 (Mansmann, I., dissenting). 
126. Id. The dissent referred to Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1916), for 
the proposition that "[s]tatutory words are uniformly presumed, unless the contrary ap­
pears, to be used in their ordinary and usual sense and with the meaning commonly attrib­
uted to them." Id. at 485-86. 
Caminetti addressed statutory language very different from the language at issue in 
Columbus Country Club. The statute in question in Caminetti was the White Slave Traffic 
(Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-24 
(1988)). The Mann Act made it illegal to "knowingly transport, or cause to be transported 
... in interstate commerce, any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or ... for 
'any other immoral purpose.''' Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added). The defend­
ant in Caminetti contended that the words "any other immoral purpose" did not apply to 
him, as the Act only applied to persons transporting women for purposes of pecuniary gain, 
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contrary did not appear from the legislative history or other case law, 
the words "in conjunction with" must be used in their ordinary and 
usual sense. 127 The dissenting judge asserted that the ordinary and 
usual sense of the phrase "in conjunction with" does not include mu­
tuality.128 The dissent therefore found that the majority had con­
strued the words "in conjunction with" more narrowly than their 
common meaning by requiring a mutual relationship between the 
Church and the Club. 129 
The dissent then examined the facts of the case, placing special 
emphasis upon the Club's history and its relationship with the 
Church. The dissent imputed great significance to the following facts: 
the Club grounds were dedicated in a special religious ceremony when 
the Club initially opened; the Archbishop granted the Club "special 
permission" to have mass celebrated every Sunday in the summer sea­
son and provided the Club with a priest to celebrate the mass; every 
whereas he had transported a woman across state lines in order to have her live with him as 
his mistress. The Court held that the words "immoral purpose" were plain and unambigu­
ous, and included Caminetti's behavior within their scope. The Court referred to the 
"views that are almost universally held in this country as to the relations which may right­
fully, from the standpoint of morality, exist between man and woman." [d. at 487. 
The dissenting judge in Columbus Country Club referred to this case in support of her 
contention that unambiguous statutory words must be interpreted in their ordinary and 
usual sense. However, the Caminetti Court was interpreting language that, although obvi­
ously unambiguous in 1916, would perhaps be viewed as ambiguous today. 
127. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 887-88 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
128. [d. The dissent did not, however, cite to any authority for the dictionary mean­
ing of the term "in conjunction with." 
"Conjunction" has been defined as "joining together, marriage union, connexion of 
ideas, ... the fact or condition of being conjoined." OXFORD ENGLISH OICfIONARY 740 
(2d ed. 1989). "Conjoined" is defined as "joined together, united, combined, allied." [d. at 
737. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 479 (1961) defines "conjoin" 
as "to join together for a common purpose." "Conjunctive" is defined as "connecting in a 
manner denoting union." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 302 (6th ed. 1990). 
The concept of mutuality is not entirely excluded from these definitions. If the term 
"in conjunction with" admits of any ambiguity, then a court should look to Congress' 
intent when enacting either the exemption or the statute as a whole. 
The Club argued in its Petition for Rehearing En Banc that it was affiliated with the 
Church rather than operated in conjunction with the Church. The Club stated that Web­
ster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines "affiliated with" as "connected with," and 
that this term does not imply mutuality. Defendant's Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 6, 
Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1196). 
In response, the government argued that the proper inquiry was whether the Club was 
operated in conjunction with the Church. It stated that Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary defines "conjoin" as "to join together (as separate entities) for a common pur­
pose." The government argued that joining two or more entities together for a common 
purpose requires a mutual relationship. United States' Opposition to Defendant's Petition 
for Rehearing En Banc at 6 n.7, Columbus Country Club (No. 90-1196). 
129. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 887 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
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evening during the summer months, member families met to pray in 
the Club's chapel; and the Club's Sunday offering was always given to 
the local parish. 130 Furthermore, the dissent noted that the pastor of 
the local parish had submitted an affidavit with the Club's motion for 
summary judgment. This affidavit stated that the Club was a commu­
nity of Roman Catholic families and comprised a "Roman Catholic 
organization"; that the privilege of mass every Sunday is a "rare and 
unusual privilege"; and "the Roman Catholic church recognizes and 
approves of the assembly of a group of Roman Catholic families for a 
summer retreat of weekly worship and daily prayer together as a valu­
able and legitimate exercise of their religious beliefs." 131 Conse­
quently, the dissent concluded that, even if the proper standards for 
interpreting the language of the exemption were mutuality or control, 
these facts indicated that the Club had met these standards. 132 
If the standard were control of the Club by the Church, the dis­
senting judge agreed with the district court's concession that "as a 
strictly legal proposition," the Club was not controlled by the 
Church.133 However, because of the Church's ability to " 'grant or 
withhold the privilege of holding services in the Club chapel-a privi­
lege which is central to the traditional operations of the Club-' " the 
dissent agreed with the district court's contention that the Church did, 
in effect, have" 'a significant degree of control over the Club.' "134 
The dissent found that the Church had in fact used this control over 
the Club in "bringing it into compliance with the Church's policy 
130. Id. at 886. 
131. Id. at 886-87. The parish priest had testified before the district court that the 
Club was a Catholic organization. However, the Catholic Church itself takes the position 
that some sort of formal relationship is required before any institution can call itself "Cath­
olic." For a detailed discussion of these requirements, see Francis G. Morrissey, O.M.I., 
What Makes an Institution "Catholic?", 47 JURIST 531 (1987). The 1983 Code of Canon 
Law provides certain specific criteria of Catholicity: I) relationship or accountability to 
diocesan bishop or some other competent ecclesiastical authority; 2) control or supervision 
by competent ecclesiastical authority; or 3) recognition by way of written document. Id. at 
535-36. "No private association of the Christian faithful in the Church is recognized unless 
its statutes are reviewed by the competent authority." Id. at 536 (citing 1983 Code c. 299, 
§ 3). Separate incorporation does not in and of itself sever ties with the Church if the 
organization has already met the first two essential criteria, for example, if the organization 
was originally recognized by, and accountable to, the Church. Id. at 538. However, until 
an association's status has been reviewed by the Church, the group has no standing as a 
Catholic organization. Id. 
132. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 888. 
133. Id. at 887 (citing United States v. Columbus Country Club, No. 87-8164, 1989 
WL 149935, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 1989». 
134. Id. 
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against sex discrimination."13s 
On the other hand, if the standard were a mutuality of relation­
ship between the Club and Church, the dissent asserted that this stan­
dard was satisfied for two reasons: the Church granted the privilege 
of celebrating mass on Club grounds, and the Club's members adhered 
to the tenets of the Roman Catholic faith and donated the mass' 
weekly offering to the local parish. The dissent concluded that" '[t]he 
persons who, over the years, have operated and controlled the Club 
have do [sic] so "in conjunction with" their continuing obligations as 
members of the Roman Catholic faith.' "136 The dissenting judge was 
of the opinion that these facts established that the Club was in fact 
operated in conjunction with the Church, and thus entitled to the ben­
efit of the Act's exemption. 137 
The Columbus Country Club dissent's approach to the Act's reli­
gious organization exemption would provide an opportunity for orga­
nizations with few formal ties to a church to discriminate on religious 
grounds. 138 The majority's narrower approach, on the other hand, 
135. Id. at 888. This comment, regarding the Church's policy against sex discrimi­
nation, is apparently a reference to the Church's response to Mrs. Gualteri's complaint to it 
after being denied membership in the Club because of her sex. The Church's action took 
place prior to Mrs. Gualteri's request that the government file suit due to the Club's second 
denial of annual membership status. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. 
136. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 887 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Columbus Country Club, No. 87-8164, Slip Op. at 10-11 (E.D. Pa. 1989». 
The dissenting judge was also dissatisfied with the possible constitutional implications 
of the majority's narrow construction of the exemption. She referred to the "First Amend­
ment implications" of the case. Id. at 888. Her apparent concern, while not fully articu­
lated, seemed to be that the majority's rule would negatively impact upon the Club 
members' free exercise rights. The dissent also expressed concern over the impact of this 
decision upon similar groups of religious individuals who gather together to express their 
beliefs. Id. These considerations were not addressed by the majority opinion because the 
district court had not addressed them. See supra note 15 and infra note 227. See also infra 
notes 229-42 for a discussion of the district court's treatment of these constitutional issues 
on remand. 
137. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 888. 
138. In its Petition for Rehearing En Banc, the Club argued that a narrow interpre­
tation of the exemption (requiring a mutual relationship between the organization seeking 
the exemption and a church) would eliminate the possibility of groups such as the Quakers, 
who, it said, have no relationship with any structured church body, ever being able to 
operate a summer camp for Quakers. The Club argued that no mutuality can exist if there 
is no church with which the group could have a mutual relationship. See Appellee Colum­
bus Country Club's Petition for Reargument En Banc at 2-3, United States v. Columbus 
Country Club, 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1196), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2797 
(1991). 
Notwithstanding the Club's arguments, a narrow interpretation of the exemption 
would not prevent the Quakers from operating a summer camp. It would prevent them 
from discriminating amongst campers on the basis of religion. The group might lose its 
exclusively Quaker character if someone belonging to another religion wished to join. The 
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would limit the number and type of groups able to take advantage of 
the exemption. Such a limitation would arguably promote the general 
aim of the Act by reducing the number and type of entities that are 
allowed to practice religious discrimination in housing. 
Both the Columbus Country Club majority and dissenting opin­
ions confined their analyses to the Fair Housing Act. Neither opinion 
considered case law interpreting any other statute with a religious ex­
emption. A similar exemption for religious organizations is contained 
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII").139 Due to 
the similarity of the purposes of the two statutes, courts interpreting 
portions of the Fair Housing Act have found it helpful as an interpre­
tive aid to refer to cases construing Title VII.I40 Furthennore, a com­
parison between the Fair Housing Act's exemption and the Title VII 
and state housing law religious organization exemptions is useful, not 
only because of the similarity of their purpose and language, but also 
because of the lack of case law interpreting the Fair Housing Act's 
exemption and the existence of case law interpreting the Title VII ex­
emption and the state housing law exemptions. Thus, in order to de­
termine which of the conflicting interpretations of the Fair Housing 
Act's religious organization exemption is correct, it is useful to con­
sider case law interpreting the Title VII exemption and the state fair 
housing law exemptions. 
III. 	 THE TITLE VII RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION EXEMPTION AND 
STATE FAIR HOUSING ACT EXEMPTIONS 
A. Purpose and Language of the Title VII Exemption 
Title VII provides that employers may not fail or refuse to em­
ploy, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against their employees on 
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.141 However, 
like the Fair Housing Act, Title VII does exempt certain classes of 
"religious" employers from its provisions,142 and a substantial body of 
group would, however, still be free to practice its religious beliefs. See infra note 230 and 
accompanying text. 
139. The exemption provides that the prohibition on discrimination shall not apply 
to "a religious corporation, association, educational institution or society." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-l (1988) (original version at Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 
88-352, 78 Stat. 255). 
140. See supra note 108. Similarly, courts addressing interpretation ofTitle VII have 
turned to case law construing the similar provisions of the Fair Housing Act. See infra 
note 152 and accompanying text. 
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (1988) (original version at Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255). 
142. See infra note 147 for the text of the exemption. 
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case law exists interpreting that exemption. 143 
Title VII provides an exemption for religious organizations and 
schools that is similar, but not identical, to the statutory language at 
issue in the Fair Housing Act's exemption. The Title VII exemption 
applies only to a religious corporation, association, or society,144 Title 
VII does not contain the terms "operated in conjunction with," "con­
trolled by," or "supervised by" which are included in the Fair Hous­
ing Act's exemption, and which were the subject of disagreement in 
the Columbus Country Club opinion. 145 
The Title VII exemption, as originally enacted, had allowed reli­
gious corporations, religious associations, or religious societies to dis­
criminate in employment on the basis of religion if the employee's 
work was "connected with" the organization's "carrying on" of its 
religious activities, or "connected with" the organization's "educa­
tional activities."I46 A 1972 amendment147 enlarged the scope of the 
Title VII religious organization exemption. The current exemption al­
lows religious discrimination by a religious corporation, religious asso­
ciation, religious educational institution, or religious society if the 
employee's work is connected with the carrying on of any of the or­
ganization's activities. 148 
The constitutionality of the 1972 amendment to Title VII's reli­
gious organization exemption was questioned by various scholars149 
143. See infra notes 154-75 and accompanying text. 
144. See infra note 147. 
145. See infra text accompanying notes 213-14 for a comparison of the relevant stat­
utory language of the two exemptions. 
146. Prior to its amendment in 1972, the original exemption provided as follows: 
This title shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens 
outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association or society with respect 
to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work con­
nected with the carrying on by such corporation, association or society of its reli­
gious activities or to an educational institution with respect to the employment of 
individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of such 
institution. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 702, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 304 (current version at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-l (1988». 
147. The amended exemption provides as follows: 

This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of 

aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, educational 

institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particu­

lar religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, 
association, educational institution or society of its activities. 
Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 103 (1972), (amending § 702) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-l (1988». 
148. See supra note 147. 
149. Some commentators had stated that the 1972 amendment was on a direct colli­
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and at least two courts, ISO but was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos.1SI 
sion course with the Establishment Clause because the government, by classifying certain 
organizations as "religious," was defining or establishing religion. Furthermore, critics said 
that by offering exceptions to some groups and not to others on the basis of these govern· 
mental or judicial definitions of religion, the government was practicing discrimination on 
the basis of religion. See Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name 0/ the Lord: A 
Critical Evaluation 0/Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1514 
(1979). See also Sharon L. Worthing, "Religion" and "Religious Institutions" Under the 
First Amendment, 7 PEPP. L. REV. 313 (1980) (examining whether governmental definition 
of "religion" for purposes of tax exemption or statutory exclusions comes too close to an 
unconstitutional establishment of religion). 
Other commentators have argued that the 1972 amendment to Title VII's religious 
organization exemption poses problems under the Free Exercise Clause. See Ira C. Lupu, 
Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case 0/ Employment Discrimina­
tion, 67 B.U. L. REv. 391 (1987) (discussing the scope of exemptions, based on the Free 
Exercise Clause, from statutory prohibitions against employment discrimination, and con­
cluding that a religious organization's "members-only" employment policies are consistent 
with accepted view of religious freedom and freedom of association). 
1SO. See Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints, 594 F. Supp. 791 (D. Utah 1984), vacated, 618 F. Supp. 1013 (D. 
Utah 1985), rev'd, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); King's Garden v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), 
cerro denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974). 
151. 483 U.S. 327 (1987), revg Amos, 618 F. Supp. 1013 (D. Utah 1985). 
The Supreme Court held that the amended exemption, even as it applied to the secular 
activities of a religious organization, withstood scrutiny under the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment because it met the three-part test set out in Lemon V. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602 (1971). The first prong of that test requires that the challenged law "have a 
secular legislative purpose." Id. at 612. The Amos Court held that this language only 
means that Congress must avoid a particular point of view when legislating regarding reli­
gious matters. It does not mean that the law must be totally unrelated to religion. Amos, 
483 U.S. at 335. A permissible legislative purpose under the first part of the Lemon test is 
an aim to avoid governmental interference with religious organizations' abilities to "define 
and carry out their religious missions." Id. at 339. The Court noted that this purpose 
motivated the 1972 amendment to the Title VII exemption. Id. 
The second prong of the Lemon test is satisfied if the law has a " 'principal or primary 
effect ... that neither advances nor inhibits religion.''' Id. at 336 (quoting Lemon, 403 
U.S. at 612). The Amos Court held that the amended Title VII exemption satisfied this 
test, because "[a] law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance 
religion, which is their very purpose. For a law to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, it 
must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activi­
ties and influence." Id. at 337. 
Finally, the Amos Court found that the amended exemption also satisfied the third 
prong of the Lemon test, which requires that the statute not impermissibly entangle church 
and state. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. The Amos Court held that, by prohibiting governmen­
tal inquiry into whether an employee is employed in a "religious" aspect of the organiza­
tion's affairs, the 1972 version of the exemption does just the opposite of entangling church 
and state. Amos, 483 U.S. at 339. 
Part IV of this Note examines whether the considerations the Amos Court addressed 
would apply if the constitutionality ofthe Columbus Country Club majority's interpretation 
of the Fair Housing Act's religious organization exemption were questioned. Part IV also 
86 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:61 
B. Case Law Interpreting the Title VII Exemption 
Courts construing provisions other than the religious organiza­
tion exemptions of the Fair Housing Act and Title VII have held that 
the similarities between these two statutes require a comparison be­
tween them.ls2 An analysis of how Title VII's religious organization 
exemption is applied might therefore shed some light on the wisdom of 
either the dissent's approach or the majority's approach in Columbus 
Country Club. 
An examination of the case law that has interpreted Title VII's 
religious organization exemption indicates that an organization seek­
ing to benefit from the exemption must have some formal ties with a 
church in order to qualify for the exemption. The organizations ex­
empted from Title VII's requirements can be divided into four catego­
ries: (1) organizations that are in themselves considered "religious" 
organizations, (2) organizations that are wholly owned and operated 
by a church, (3) organizations that are privately owned and run for 
profit, and (4) privately owned, nonprofit organizations. 153 
addresses whether any other constitutional challenges could appropriately be raised, and, if 
so, what the result would likely be. 
152. EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 
U.S. 912 (1981). The court held that "the strong similarities between the language, design, 
and purposes of Title VII and the Fair Housing Act require that the phrase 'a person 
claiming to be aggrieved' in § 706 of Title VII must be construed in the same manner that 
Trafficante construed the term 'aggrieved person' in § 810 ofthe Fair Housing Act." Id. at 
482 (quoting Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972». 
Interestingly, in reaching its decision to construe standing broadly under the Fair 
Housing Act, the Trafficante Court relied in part upon the decision to construe standing 
broadly in a Title VII case, Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971). The 
Hackett court's decision turned on the construction of § 706's "aggrieved person" phrase. 
That court found that Congress' intent was "to define standing as broadly as is permitted 
by Article III of the Constitution." Id. at 446. The Trafficante Court held that, "[w]ith 
respect to suits brought under the 1968 [Fair Housing] Act, we reach the same conclusion." 
Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209. 
Commentators have also urged that the criteria establishing a prima facie case under 
Title VII are equally applicable to suits under the Fair Housing Act. See Elliot M. 
Mincberg, Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, II 
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 128 (1976). 
See supra note 108 for a further discussion of cases holding that certain sections of 
Title VII and the Fair Housing Act should be similarly construed. 
153. See Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 
1991) (not-for-profit hospital not owned by a church); EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg., 
859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989) (privately owned manufac­
turing corporation); King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 996 (1974) (radio station wholly owned by religious organization); Amos, 594 F. Supp. 
at 795-96 (business wholly owned by religious organization); Feldstein v. Christian Science 
Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974 (D. Mass. 1983) (newspaper wholly owned by religious 
organization). 
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Courts dealing with organizations within the first category (enti­
ties that courts consider "religious" organizations) obviously do not 
examine whether there is any formal connection between two entities 
because the church and the organization seeking the exemption are 
one and the same. For example, many courts have accepted the prop­
osition that the Salvation Army falls within the first category and is 
either a "religious corporation" or a religion in and of itself for pur­
poses of the Title VII exemption.l s4 However, cases dealing with or­
ganizations falling within the last three categories do require some 
type of formal connection between the organization seeking the ex­
emption and a church, although the nature and extent of that connec­
tion varies from category to category. 
Organizations that are within the second category, those owned 
and operated by a religious organization, necessarily have formal ties 
to the religious organization, ISS and thus almost always qualify for the 
exemption. ls6 The Supreme Court held in Amos IS7 that the exemp­
154. Salvation Army v. New Jersey Dep't of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183 (3d 
Cir. 1990); McClure v. Salvation Army, 323 F. Supp. 1100, 1101 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 
460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cerro denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972); Salvation Army v. United States, 
138 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Bennett v. City of La Grange, 112 S.E. 482 (Ga. 1922). 
155. In King's Garden, the court considered the Title VII exemption's application to 
a group of religious ministries that jointly owned a radio station for the purpose of promot­
ing the ministries' common aim to "share Christ world wide." King's Garden, 498 F.2d at 
52. The King's Garden court found that the group that owned the radio station was a 
religious organization. However, it also ruled that the station could not discriminate on the 
basis of religion in employment, because the court determined that FCC regulations, rather 
than Title VII and its exemption, applied to the station. Id. at 53. The court also deter­
mined that the 1972 amendment to the Title VII exemption was probably not constitu­
tional, due to its perception that the 1972 amendment was in conflict with the 
Establishment Clause. Id. at 54-57. See supra note 151 and accompanying text for a dis­
cussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Amos that the 1972 amendment was constitu­
tional. 
In dicta, the King's Garden court stated that, if it were basing its decision on the Title 
VII exemption, and if the radio station had been incorporated separately from the religious 
organization, the exemption might not have applied. King's Garden, 498 F.2d at 54 n.7. 
However, the court went on to state that if separate incorporation presented a problem, 
religious groups could simply avoid separate incorporation of their "commercial enter­
prises," and thus take advantage of the exemption. Id. 
156. Under the post-1972 exemption, any "religious corporation, association, educa­
tional institution or society" is exempt from Title VII's requirements concerning employees 
performing any work for the entity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l (1988). If the entity is a corpora­
tion that is wholly owned by the religious organization the exemption will apply even if the 
corporation is engaged in secular pursuits. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
The lower Amos court had set out a three-part test to determine whether the activities 
of an organization falling within the second category would qualify under the pre-1972 
exemption. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter­
Day Saints v. Amos, 594 F. Supp. 791,799 (D. Utah 1984), vacated, 618 F. Supp. 1015 (D. 
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tion is available for any activities of a "religious" corporation, associa­
tion, educational institution, or society. ISS The entity with which the 
Amos Court was concerned was a wholly church-owned corporation 
that was engaged in relatively secular pursuits, manufacturing cloth­
ing and operating a gym. 1S9 The Supreme Court found that because 
the corporation was "a religious entity associated with the Church," it 
was entitled to the exemption. l60 
Organizations within the third category (privately owned, for­
profit entities) seem to encounter difficulties when they attempt to 
claim the benefit of the Title VII exemption. A relatively recent case 
in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, EEOC v. Townley Engi-
Utah 1985), rev'd, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). The lower court's view was that the 1972 amend­
ment to the exemption was unconstitutional because it violated the Establishment Clause. 
Id. at 804-28. The pre-1972 exemption applied only to the religious activities of a religious 
corporation, association, educational institution, or society. See supra note 146 for the text 
of the pre-1972 exemption. 
The lower court's test required the court to scrutinize the connection between the 
church and the organization seeking the exemption in matters such as financial manage­
ment and daily operation of the organization. Amos, 594 F. Supp. at 799. Then, the court 
should examine the connection between the religion's tenets and the activity in question 
and determine whether the activity is required by particular tenets of the religion. If the 
ties between the church and the organization seeking the exemption are relatively weak in 
these regards, the court must engage in a third inquiry, focusing on the relationship be­
tween the nature of the job being performed and the religious rituals or tenets of the partic­
ular religion. Id. The activity could only be deemed "religious" if the court found a 
"substantial relationship" between the two organizations, or between the particular job and 
the religious tenets of the religion in question. Id. 
The Amos court granted summary judgment to the defendant employer with regard to 
the plaintiffs' wrongful discharge and emotional distress claims, but denied defendant's mo­
tion for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs' claims under federal and state employment 
discrimination law. Id. at 831. However, this decision was vacated to allow the United 
States to intervene. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 618 F. Supp. 1015 (D. Utah 1985), rev'd, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
Appeal was then taken directly to the Supreme Court after the district court affirmed its 
prior decision to grant summary judgment. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment, 
and affirmed the constitutionality of the 1972 amendment to the religious organization ex­
emption. However, some of the standards contained in the district court's test under the 
pre -1972 exemption might still be applicable to an analysis of whether a particular organi­
zation is entitled to claim the post-1972 Title VII exemption. See infra notes 200-03 and 
accompanying text for an application of the Amos test to the facts of Columbus Country 
Club. See infra notes 244-54 and accompanying text for an application of the Lemon test 
to the Columbus Country Club majority's interpretation of the Fair Housing Act's 
exemption. 
157. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
158. Id. at 339. 
159. Amos, 594 F. Supp. at 795-96. 
160. Amos, 483 U.S. at 330. 
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neering & Manufacturing Co. ,161 concerned an organization within the 
third category. Townley Engineering Company was a privately owned 
manufacturing business that was operated for profit. 162 It attempted 
to claim the Title VII exemption based on the highly religious attitude 
of its owners, its dissemination of religious materials, and its financial 
contributions to churches. 163 The Ninth Circuit recognized that there 
was relatively little case law to aid in determining precisely the type of 
relationship that would qualify a privately owned, for-profit corpora­
tion for this exemption.164 However, the court determined that the 
exemption did not apply.16s It examined the legislative history of the 
Title VII exemption and found that Congress' intent was that "only 
those institutions with extremely close ties to organized religions 
would be covered."166 The Ninth Circuit held that the appropriate 
test was whether the company's purpose and character were primarily 
religious or primarily secular. In applying that test to the facts of the 
case, the court determined that the company was primarily secular, 
since it was organized primarily for profit, was not affiliated with or 
supported by a church, and its articles of incorporation did not men­
tion a religious purpose.167 The court held that "the beliefs of the 
owners and operators of a corporation are simply not enough in them­
selves to make the corporation 'religious' within the meaning of [the 
exemption]."168 The court declined to further define the scope of the 
exemption and stated that each case must be decided upon an exami­
nation of all pertinent facts.169 
Organizations within the fourth category, privately owned, non­
profit corporations, may often have closer ties to a religious entity than 
corporations which are operated for profit. Since their purposes are 
often charitable or otherwise linked with the promotion of a religion's 
views, the church may have a vested interest in exercising some con­
161. 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989). 
162. Id. at 611-12. 
163. The corporation sent out a gospel tract with each mailing, printed biblical 
verses on all invoices and purchase orders, gave financial support to churches, and held 
devotional services once a week on company property during working hours. An employee 
objected to being forced to attend these services. During the subsequent suit against the 
corporation by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the court held that the 
company did not fall within the Title VII exemption even though the owners' intent was 
that it would be a "Christian, faith·operated business." Id. at 612. 
164. Id. at 618. 
165. Id. at 617. 
166. Id. at 618. 
167. Id. at 619. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 618. 
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trol over the organization's operation. In Scharon v. St. Luke's Episco­
pal Presbyterian Hospitals,l7O the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit held that Title VII's prohibition against religious discrimina­
tion in employment could not apply to an organization falling within 
the fourth category. 171 In Scharon, the plaintiff employee (a chaplain) 
claimed that she was fired in violation of Title VII.I72 The court held 
that the hospital's admitted employment discrimination on religious 
grounds was not subject to suit under Title VII. 173 The hospital's arti­
cles of association provided that the church must approve any amend­
ments to the hospital's articles of incorporation, and gave the church 
the power to nominate persons to the board of directors.l74 The court 
held that these factors were sufficient indicia of control by the church 
to show the hospital's affiliation with the church, and the hospital 
therefore was not subject to Title VII's requirements. l7S 
It should be noted that the tests discussed in this section have 
been formulated by different jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction will prob­
ably continue to use its own test regardless of the type of entity claim­
ing the exemption. Thus, the Ninth Circuit might use the Townley 
test176 even if it were presented with an entity other than a privately 
owned, for-profit corporation. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit might use 
the Scharon test 177 even if the organization claiming the exemption 
were not a privately owned, not-for-profit corporation. This Note 
classifies the different types of exempt organizations into four different 
categories for analytical purposes, not because a different test necessar­
ily applies to each. Each court addressing the exemption's scope has 
based its ultimate decision on the presence or absence of control and/ 
170. 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991). 
171. Id. at 361-63. Interestingly, the Scharon court did not base its decision on an 
interpretation of the Title VII exemption. The court did not mention the exemption. In­
stead, it held that applying Title VII to the facts of the case would require constitutionally 
prohibited governmental entanglement with religion. Id. at 362. 
172. Id. at 361. 
173. Id. at 362. See supra note 171. 
174. Scharon, 929 F.2d at 362. 
175. Id. Because of the presence of church-appointed members on the hospital's 
board of directors and the requirement of church approval for any changes to the hospital's 
articles of incorporation, the court characterized the hospital as a "church-affiliated hospi­
tal, with 'substantial religious character.''' Id. (quoting Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal 
Presbyterian Hosps., 736 F. Supp. 1018, 1019 (E.O. Mo. 1990». In dicta, the court stated 
that even though the hospital, in its relationship with the general public, could arguably be 
characterized as a secular organization, in its relationship with the plaintiff, who was em­
ployed by the hospital as a chaplain, the hospital was "without question a religious organi­
zation." Id. 
176. See supra notes 161-69 and accompanying text. 
177. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text. 
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or a forma1 relationship between the religious organization and the 
entity seeking to benefit from the exemption. 178 
178. Courts dealing with wholly different concerns have also addressed considera­
tions similar to those facing courts interpreting the scope of the Title VII exemption. For 
example, the presence or absence of control or a formal relationship between an entity and 
a church were addressed in Kendrick v. Sullivan, 766 F. Supp. 1180 (D.D.C. 1991). The 
Kendrick court developed a test that is similar to those developed in cases dealing with the 
Title VII exemption. The Kendrick court's decision ultimately rested upon whether or not 
certain organizations receiving grants under the Adolescent Family Life Act, Pub. L. No. 
97-35, 95 Stat. 578 (1981) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300z (1988» ("AFLA") 
were so closely allied with organized religion that the funding would constitute government 
assistance to a religious group. Kendrick, 766 F. Supp. at 1181. The court examined 
whether AFLA, which provided financial support to groups assisting pregnant or sexually 
active teenagers, was in violation of the Establishment Clause as it applied to certain 
groups. Id. The Supreme Court had recently reversed the district court's decision that 
AFLA was facially unconstitutional. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), revg, 657 
F. Supp. 	1547 (D.D.C. 1987). 
AFLA provides for the Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services to 
administer grants to public or private non-profit organizations that offer care to pregnant or 
sexually active adolescents. Kendrick, 766 F. Supp. at 1182. The services funded include 
pregnancy testing, maternity counseling, and educational services designed to prevent pre­
marital sexual relations among adolescents. Id. 
The defendant was the Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services. 
Plaintiff's contended that since some organizations connected with religious organizations 
were among the groups funded by the defendant pursuant to AFLA, the statute was uncon­
stitutional as it applied to those organizations. Plaintiffs argued that because AFLA, by 
providing funding for those organizations, advanced religion and/or "foster[ed] an exces­
sive entanglement of government and religion," it violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 
1183. 
The court applied the Lemon test and determined that AFLA, as applied to those 
organizations, had a valid secular purpose, thus satisfying the first part of the test. Id. at 
1184. See supra note 151 and accompanying text for the Lemon test. 
The court then addressed whether AFLA had the primary effect of advancing religion 
by providing funding for religious organizations, which would render it unconstitutional 
under the second part of the Lemon test. Kendrick, 766 F. Supp. at 1184. In furtherance 
of that inquiry, the court had to determine whether the organizations funded through the 
statute's provisions were "pervasively sectarian" and whether their activity was "religious." 
Id. 
The district court noted that the Supreme Court had mandated the use of this "perva­
sively sectarian" standard in its prior decision held that AFLA was facially constitutional. 
Id. at 1181 (referring to Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988». The Supreme Court 
had stated that courts should consider factors such as whether an organization has "ex­
plicit corporate ties to a particular religious faith and by-laws or policies that prohibit any 
deviation from religious doctrine" in their determination of whether an institution is "per­
vasively sectarian." Bowen, 487 U.S. at 620 n.16. On remand, the district court's determi­
nation of whether the grantees were pervasively sectarian turned on the grantees' formal 
religious affiliation. In assessing their formal religious affiliation, or lack thereof, the court 
scrutinized the following factors: statements of religious purpose in the grantees' by-laws; 
specific policies that forbade deviation from the doctrines or tenets of the religions with 
which the grantees were associated; and requirements that religious leaders sit on the orga­
nizations' boards of directors. Kendrick, 766 F. Supp. at 1185. The court also considered 
whether the grantees had reserved the right to discriminate in employment on the basis of 
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C. State Fair Housing Statutes 
State court decisions interpreting religious organization exemp­
tions in state fair housing statutes provide another source of interpre­
tive standards which can assist a court seeking to interpret the Fair 
Housing Act's religious organization exemption. The legislative his­
tory of the Fair Housing Act contains a suggestion that in "borderline 
cases," courts should look to state housing laws for guidance. 179 Its 
unique factual situation makes Columbus Country Club a "borderline" 
case, and state law might provide some helpful insights. 
Pennsylvania (the Club's location) and New York have housing 
statutes that contain religious organization exemptions remarkably 
similar to the Fair Housing Act's exemption. 180 While Pennsylvania 
courts have not interpreted the exemption, a New York court has 
done so in Cowen v. Lily Dale Assembly.181 Lily Dale was factually 
religion, and whether the grantees' recruitment of new employees was carried out through 
religious organizations. Id. However, the district court was considering a motion for sum­
mary judgment. Since the existence of the determinative factors was disputed, the court 
held that the question of whether the grantees were in fact "pervasively sectarian" could 
not be decided as a matter of law. Id. at 1192. 
The factors upon which the Kendrick court relied are similar to the factors considered 
by the courts that interpreted the scope of the Title VII exemption. A combination of some 
or all of these factors might be useful in an interpretation of the scope of the Fair Housing 
Act's exemption. 
179. See supra note 48. 
180. Pennsylvania's statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 

Nothing in clause (h) of this section shall bar any religious or denominational 

institution or organization or any charitable or educational organization, which is 

operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organiza­

tion or any bona fide private or fraternal organization from giving preference to 

persons of the same religion or denomination or to members of such private or 

fraternal organization from making such selection as is calculated by such organi­

zation to promote the religious principles or the aims, purposes or fraternal prin­

ciples for which it is established or maintained. 

Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955(i)(2) (1991). 
The New York statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to bar any religious or de­
nominational institution or organization, or any organization operated for chari­
table or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or controlled by or in 
connection with a religious organization, from limiting employment or sales or 
rental of housing accommodations or admission to or giving preference to persons 
of the same religion or denomination or from making such selection as is calcu­
lated by such organization to promote the religious principles for which it is es­
tablished or maintained. 
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (11), (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992). 
181. 354 N.Y.S.2d 269 (App. Div. 1974). Plaintiff sued Lily Dale Assembly for dis­
crimination on the basis of religion in connection with the rental of residential property on 
Lily Dale's premises. Id. at 270-71. Lily Dale owned 172 acres of land, containing reli­
gious, residential, and recreational buildings. Id. at 270. Lily Dale's bylaws stated that its 
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similar to Columbus Country Club in that Lily Dale involved a sum­
mer camp that wished to avoid selling a leasehold interest in camp 
property to a party who was not a member of the Assembly. 182 The 
Assembly sought the protection of the state housing act's religious or­
ganization exemption. The court held that the Assembly was a reli­
gious institution within the meaning of the exemption, noting that it 
had received a charter from the National Spiritualist Association. 183 
The court focused on the formal ties between the Assembly and the 
Association, which was considered a church. 184 The court discounted 
the secular contemporaneous educational use to which the Assembly's 
property was put, and instead relied on its formal affiliation with the 
Association. 18s 
All of the Title VII cases, and the state housing act case discussed 
in this section, were decided based upon the courts' analysis of the 
legal, formal, and/or factual connection between the organization 
seeking a religious exemption and a church. The analyses in which the 
different courts engaged are equally applicable to organizations seek­
ing to claim the Fair Housing Act's exemption. 
purposes included "benevolent, charitable, literary and scientific purposes and mutual im­
provement in the religious knowledge of Spiritualism." Id. Plaintiffs asserted that Lily 
Dale was not a religious organization within the meaning of the exemption. Id. at 271. 
182. Id. at 270. The Columbus Country Club cited Lily Dale in support of its argu­
ment that the Club was itself a religious organization within the plain meaning of the term 
"religious organization." Appellee Columbus Country Club's Petition for Reargument En 
Banc at 5, United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90­
1196), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991). 
The Club also cited Lake Brady Spiritualists Camp Ass'n. v. Brown, 402 N.E.2d 1187 
(Ohio 1980), in support of this proposition, although the statute at issue in Lake Brady was 
not a state fair housing act. In Lake Brady, the organization in question was a summer 
camp, containing a hotel, cottages, and a church. The organization had applied for a bingo 
license, but the relevant authorities denied its application. Id. at 1187-88. The Attorney 
General approved the denial on the ground that the organization was not a .. 'religious 
organization.''' Id. The organization appealed, and the Lake Brady court held that the 
camp was a religious organization for purposes of the state law regulating the granting of 
bingo licenses. Id. at 1187. The camp's articles of incorporation specifically stated that the 
camp's purpose was investigating the phenomenon of modern spiritualism and promoting 
spiritualism. Id. at 1188 n.1. The statute at issue defined a "religious organization" as one 
that consisted of "any church, body of communicants, or group that is not organized or 
operated for profit, that gathers in common membership for regular worship and religious 
observances." Id. at 1188. The court found that the camp members did gather for regular 
worship and/or religious observances, and that the camp was thus a religious organization. 
Id. 
It should be noted that the Fair Housing Act, the statute at issue in Columbus Country 
Club, contains no such definition of a religious organization. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 
(1988). 
183. Lily Dale Assembly, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 271. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
94 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:61 
IV. ApPLICATION OF THE TITLE VII TESTS, THE STATE 

HOUSING ACT TEST, AND CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS TO THE 

FAIR HOUSING ACT'S EXEMPTION 

A. 	 Application of the Title VII Tests and State Housing Act Test to 
the Facts of United States v. Columbus Country Club 186 
In the case law interpreting the Title VII religious organization 
exemption187 and the state housing act's religious organization exemp­
tions,188 the courts regarded a formal connection between a religious 
organization and the organization seeking exemption as an important, 
and often deciding, factor.189 While Title VII exempts religious corpo­
rations, associations, educational institutions, or societies,190 the Fair 
Housing Act's exemption not only embraces these religious organiza­
tions, but also covers organizations that are "operated, supervised, or 
controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization." 191 
Thus, the language of the two exemptions differs to some extent. 
However, there are several reasons for utilizing case law interpreting 
the Title VII exemption to aid in determining what type of entity 
should benefit from the Fair Housing Act's exemption. 
The purposes behind Title VII and the Fair Housing Act were the 
same-to end discrimination, whether it was encountered in the work­
place or in obtaining housing. Congress intended to allow the opera­
tion of both statutes to the fullest extent possible, in order to fully 
eliminate discrimination. 192 Limiting the scope of any exemptions to 
either statute achieves this goal by restricting the number of groups 
that may claim exemption from the statutes' mandates. 193 Requiring 
186. 	 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2797 (1991). 
187. 	 See supra notes 153-75 and accompanying text. 
188. 	 See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text. 
189. 	 For the text of the Title VII religious organization exemption, see supra note 
147. The court in EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989), noted that the general consensus after the congressional de­
bate on the original Title VII exemption was that organizations that were "merely affiliated 
with a religious organization" were not exempt. Id. at 617 (emphasis added). The court 
noted that one Congressman had suggested that the exemption should be limited to 
" 'wholly church-supported organization[s}.''' Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing EEOC Legis­
lative History of Titles VII and XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 at 3204 (1968». The 
Townley court noted that this suggestion was rejected in Congress, however, as being too 
narrow. Townley, 859 F.2d. at 617. 
190. 	 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l (1988). See supra note 147 for the text of the exemption. 
191. 	 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1988). See supra note 57 for the text of the exemption. 
192. 	 See supra note 108. 
193. The Club contended that courts have interpreted statutes designed to protect
religious freedoms broadly, and, therefore, since the Fair Housing Act's exemption is 
designed to protect such freedoms, it should be interpreted broadly. See Brief for the Ap­
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some sort of formal tie between the organization seeking the exemp­
tion and a church is one way of limiting the scope of the Fair Housing 
Act's exemption. 
Therefore, if limiting the Fair Housing Act exemption's scope is a 
desirable end, then requiring a mutual relationship between an organi­
zation seeking the exemption and a religious organization is appropri­
ate. 194 However, courts addressing the same issue in the future could 
benefit from a more precise set of factors to aid in this examination. 
Those factors can be found in the case law interpreting the Title VII 
exemption and the state housing law exemptions. 
The same type of test that was set out in Amos, 195 EEOC v. Town­
ley Engineering & Manufacturing Co. ,196 Scharon v. St. Luke's Episco­
pal Presbyterian Hospitals,197 or Cowen v. Lily Dale Assembly 198 could 
be applied to an entity seeking to benefit from the religious organiza­
tion exemption contained in the Fair Housing Act. The Amos district 
court's test, like the Townley and Scharon tests, required close ties 
between the organization seeking the exemption and the religious 
organization. 199 
The application of the Amos test to the facts of Columbus Coun­
try Club would support the majority's holding that a mutual relation­
ship between the Church and the Club was absent on the facts of the 
case. For example, the first prong of the Amos district court's test 
required that there be a close and substantial relationship between the 
church and the organization seeking the exemption in the areas of day­
to-day administration of the organization seeking the exemption or its 
pellee, Columbus Country Club, at 16-17, United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 
F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1196), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991). However, the 
Fair Housing Act as a whole was not designed to protect religious freedoms, but to elimi­
nate discrimination in housing. The Act's purpose is remedial. See supra note 108. 
194. See supra text accompanying note 110. 
195. 594 F. Supp. 791 (D. Utah 1984), vacated, 618 F. Supp. 1013 (D. Utah 1985), 
rev'd, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
196. 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989). See supra note 
163 and accompanying text. 
197. 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991). See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
198. 354 N.Y.S.2d 269 (App. Div. 1974). See supra note 184 and accompanying 
text. 
199. The original Amos test only exempted the organization's religious activities. See 
supra note 156. However, the Supreme Court decision in Amos held, contrary to the dis­
trict court's decision, that a/l activities of a qualified organization were exempt from Title 
VII's requirements. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). See supra note 151. The Supreme 
Court's decision did not, however, expressly invalidate the essential portion of the lower 
court's test, which is addressed in the text accompanying this footnote. 
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financial management. 200 As applied to the facts of Columbus Country 
Club, there was no close tie between the Club and the Catholic 
Church in areas of financial and day-to-day management of the Club. 
The Club confirmed that its board of governors, and not the Church, 
controlled "maintenance, safety, youth, entertainment, grounds, 
chapel and clubhouse. "201 While the Club donated its weekly collec­
tion to the local parish, this donation in itself was not evidence of the 
Church's control of any aspect of the Club's financial management. 
The second prong of the Amos test required that there be a close 
relationship between the church's tenets and the organization's activi­
ties.202 If this test is applied to Columbus Country Club, the facts of 
the case show that Club members' activities, while residing in the bun­
galows during the summer months, included regular worship, but also 
included many other secular, vacation-related pursuits. A court might 
engage in a fact-finding determination ofjust how much time members 
actually spent in worship to determine what the relationship was be­
tween the Church's religious tenets and the Club's activities. How­
ever, if in fact secular activities predominated, the Club would fail to 
satisfy the second prong, and therefore, under both parts of the Amos 
test, the Club would not qualify for the exemption.203 
The Townley and Scharon courts used different tests from that 
used by the Amos court.204 However, both the Townley and Scharon 
courts required that an organization have "extremely close ties" with 
an organized religion, or some indicia of control by the church over 
the organization seeking the exemption, in order for the non-church 
organization to be exempt from Title VII's requirements.2os The 
Townley court found that, since (1) the company seeking exemption 
did not mention a religious purpose in its articles of incorporation, (2) 
the company was not formally affiliated with or supported by a 
200. See supra note 156. 
201. Brief for the Appellee, Columbus Country Club at 6, United States v. Columbus 
Country Club, 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1196), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2797 
(1991). 
202. See supra note 156. The Supreme Court's decision in Amos required that a 
court consider all of the organization's activities, not just its "religious" activities. Amos, 
483 U.S. at 339. See supra note 151. 
203. The third prong of the Amos test specifically applied to employment situations 
and therefore might not prove useful in a housing situation. See supra note 156. 
204. See supra notes 166-75 and accompanying text. 
205. EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. de­
nied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 
360,362 (8th Cir. 1991). The Scharon court held that Title VII could not be constitution­
ally applied to the hospitals, but it did not address the religious organization exemption. 
[d. See supra note 171. 
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church, and (3) the company was organized primarily for profit, its 
ties were not close enough to the church to qualify as a "religious" 
corporation, notwithstanding its owners' intention that the corpora­
tion be a "faith-operated business. "206 
In applying the Townley court's criteria, the Club would satisfy 
the first prong of the test, and would possibly satisfy the third prong as 
well, because its post-1987 bylaws did mention its religious purpose 
and because it is a nonprofit organization.207 However, the Club 
would not satisfy the second prong of the Townley test, because it was 
not formally affiliated with or supported financially by the Catholic 
Church208 or any Catholic "umbrella organization."209 Therefore, the 
Townley analysis leaves room for argument, and the Club might or 
might not have had ties with the church substantial enough to have 
qualified for the exemption. 
The result under the Scharon test, on the other hand, would be 
clear-cut: the Club would not qualify for the exemption. The Scharon 
court would examine whether or not the Club's board of directors con­
tained members appointed by the Church, and whether the Church 
required, or had the power to require, prior approval of any changes to 
the Club's articles of incorporation.210 A court applying the Scharon 
test would examine these "formal" factors to determine whether the 
organization seeking the exemption was "church-affiliated[,] ... with 
'substantial religious character.' "211 The social character of the Club 
206. Townley, 859 F.2d at 612, 619. 
207. United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 880 (3d Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991). However, the bylaws only referred to the Club's reli­
gious purpose after 1987. Prior to that, its statement of purpose characterized it as a social 
group, although its official history characterized it as both a vacation group and a Catholic 
organization. Id. at 879. 
In addition, a court might analyze the Club's characterization of itself as a social 
group as comparable to a company organized primarily for profit, notwithstanding the 
religious views or intent of its founders or members. A social organization may be compa­
rable to a for-profit organization because in both cases, the entity is organized primarily for 
its own benefit or for that of its owners or members, instead of for the benefit of others. If a 
court used this analogy, the Club would not satisfy the third prong of the Townley test. 
208. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 879. 
209. United States' Opposition to Defendant's Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 7, 
Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1196), cert. denied, 111 S. 
Ct. 2797 (1991). The Club's formal relationship with the Knights of Columbus terminated 
in 1922. See supra note 76. The United States' Opposition also noted that the Club's 
formation was not required by the Church, and the Club was not required, either by the 
Church or by the tenets of Catholicism, to limit its members to Catholics. United States' 
Opposition to Defendant's Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 7. 
210. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
211. Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 362 (8th 
Cir. 1991). See supra note 175. 
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as a whole, and the lack of any formal affiliation with the Church, 
would be the determinative factors in a court's decision that it was not 
entitled to the exemption under the Scharon test. 
The Club would fail to meet the test set out in Lily Dale for the 
same reasons that the Club would not qualify for the exemption under 
the Scharon test. The Lily Dale court relied almost entirely upon the 
Assembly's formal affiliation with a religious organization in finding 
that the Assembly qualified under the New York housing law's reli­
gious organization exemption.212 
If a court were to apply any of the Title VII tests to the Fair 
Housing Act's exemption, it might conceivably encounter some 
problems. The language of the two exemptions is not identical. The 
Title VII exemption applies only to religious corporations, associa­
tions, educational institutions, or societies.213 The Fair Housing Act 
exempts not only religious organizations, associations, or societies, but 
also exempts nonprofit institutions or organizations that are operated, 
supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with religious organiza­
tions, associations, or societies.214 An application of the Title VII 
standards to the Fair Housing Act's exemption might be criticized be­
cause the language contained in the Act's exemption is arguably 
broader than that in Title VII's exemption. The dissimilarity of the 
exemptions' language in this respect could present a problem because 
Congress may have intended the Fair Housing Act's exemption to em­
brace a broader group of organizations than the Title VII exemption 
encompasses. This interpretation of Congress' intent could be sup­
ported by noting that the Fair Housing Act was passed into law in 
1968, well after Title VII's enactment in 1964.215 During those years, 
Congress might have changed its mind about the proper scope of a 
religious organization exemption and may have decided to broaden the 
scope of the Fair Housing Act's exemption. However, the Fair Hous­
ing Act's legislative history does not support this argument.216 More­
over, the initial version of the Fair Housing Act's exemption was 
drafted in 1966, only two years later than the enactment of Title 
VII.217 Therefore, it is equally conceivable that Congress intended 
courts to interpret the two exemptions similarly. 
212. Cowen v. Lily Dale Assembly. 354 N.Y.S.2d 269. 271 (App. Div. 1974). See 
supra notes 181·82 and accompanying text. 
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l (1988). 
214. 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1988). 
215. See supra notes 1. 141. 
216. See supra notes 43-60 and accompanying text. 
217. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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Furthermore, the Title VII case law supports the proposition that 
the additional language in the Fair Housing Act's exemption must be 
interpreted as stating explicitly what was implied in the Title VII ex­
emption-that a formal relationship is required between an entity 
seeking to benefit from the exemption and a church. Thus, the addi­
tional language in the Fair Housing Act's exemption would not 
broaden the class of organizations that can benefit from the Act's ex­
emption beyond the scope of those that can benefit from Title VII's 
exemption. The additional language in the Fair Housing Act's exemp­
tion just serves to make Congress' intent clearer. 
Another pertinent concern in deciding whether to apply stan­
dards developed in Title VII exemption case law to the interpretation 
of the Fair Housing Act's exemption is the different nature of the ac­
tivities prohibited under the two statutes. Unlike Title VII, the Fair 
Housing Act is not concerned with an organization's discriminatory 
treatment of its employees, but with its discriminatory sale or rental of 
housing. The two statutes arguably serve completely different pur­
poses. Congress therefore might have intended that they be inter­
preted differently, notwithstanding the similarity of the exemptions' 
language. 
However, in Amos,2lg the Supreme Court implied that it is the 
character of the organization, and not its activities, that must be ex­
amined in determining whether or not the organization falls within the 
Title VII exemption.219 This rule would apply equally well to a deci­
sion to make a comparison between the standards governing the appli­
cation of the Title VII exemption and the Fair Housing Act's 
exemption. If a court should concern itself only with the character of 
the organization, and not its activities, then whether the organization 
is discriminating in employment or in housing would seem to be 
irrelevant. 
All of the cases interpreting the scope of the Title VII exemption, 
as well as the state case law interpreting the scope of religious organi­
zation exemptions to state fair housing statutes,220 whether dealing 
with organizations wholly owned by a church, or with independently 
owned organizations, have required some sort of formal connection 
between the organization seeking to benefit from the exemption and a 
218. 483 u.s. 327 (1987). 
219. [d. at 336. The Court reasoned that if a religious organization were required. 
"on pain of substantial liability. to predict which of its activities a secular court will con­
sider religious." the organization would be so burdened with a fear of potential liability that 
it might change the way it carried out "what it understood to be its religious mission." Id. 
220. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text. 
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religious organization. These cases have all examined the following 
factors: the presence or absence of a formal affiliation with a religious 
organization; the contents of the organization's bylaws, including any 
statements of religious purpose contained therein, whether a church 
must approve any changes thereto, and whether the organization's by­
laws required that religious leaders sit on the board of directors; and 
the existence of any specific policies which forbid deviation from the 
doctrines or tenets of the religion with which the organization is 
associated. 
If a court applied all of these elements to the facts of Columbus 
Country Club, the Fair Housing Act exemption still would not have 
applied to the Club. The Club was not "formally" affiliated with the 
Church because it was not owned by the Church or operated pursuant 
to a charter or any other legally binding agreement. The Club's by­
laws, as amended in 1987, did contain a statement of religious pur­
pose,221 thus satisfying one of the elements of the combined tests. 
However, no evidence was presented as to whether the Church had the 
authority to approve or disapprove of any changes in the Club's by­
laws, and the bylaws did not require that any leaders of the Church be 
on the Club's board of directors. Only one of the factors was satisfied: 
the Club's bylaws included a statement of the Club's religious purpose. 
This is similar to the factor that the Townley court found irrelevant to 
its decision that the entity at issue was not entitled to the Title VII 
exemption.222 
B. Constitutional Considerations 
The Supreme Court held in Amos 223 that the 1972 amendment to 
Title VII's religious organization exemption did not violate the First 
Amendment's Establishment Clause.224 The majority opinion in 
Columbus Country Club did not address any constitutional issues.225 
The dissenting judge in Columbus Country Club thought that the ma­
jority's interpretation of the Fair Housing Act's exemption might in­
terfere with the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, although 
221. See supra note 86. 
222. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. If a statement of religious purpose 
were enough, any organization could qualify for the exemption simply by including such a 
statement in its bylaws. 
223. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
224. Id. at 336-39. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
225. United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 885 (3d Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991). 
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her analysis of the potential problem was somewhat sketchy.226 The 
Club argued in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court that the majority's interpretation and application of 
the Fair Housing Act's provisions to it was unconstitutional because it 
violated the Establishment Clause and the Club's members' rights 
under the Free Exercise Clause.227 The Supreme Court declined the 
Club's petition.228 
On remand to the district court, the government filed a motion 
for partial summary judgment, requesting that the court determine 
that the exemption was not unconstitutional as applied to the Club.229 
The court noted that the Club "presumably [could] make dwellings 
available on a non-discriminatory basis, in full compliance with the 
statute, without necessarily experiencing significant intrusions into the 
religious beliefs and practices of its Catholic members."23o The court 
found that, since the Club did not contend that any religious activities 
occurred anywhere other than the chapel or the shrine, the Club mem­
bers' religious observances would not be affected by allowing non­
Catholics to obtain the leasehold rights to the summer bungalows.231 
The district court held that the Club members' associational rights 
were thus not affected by compliance with the Fair Housing Act, rely­
ing principally upon the Third Circuit's decision in Salvation Army v. 
New Jersey Department of Community Affairs 232 and the Supreme 
Court's decision in Employment Division, Oregon Department of 
Human Resources v. Smith.233 
In Salvation Army, the Salvation Army ("SA") challenged a state 
226. See supra note 136. 
227. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 11-17, United States v. Columbus Country 
Club, 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1196), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991). The 
Club had also made its constitutional arguments before the Third Circuit. That court de­
clined to address these arguments since the district court had not done so. Columbus 
Country Club, 915 F.2d at 885. See supra note 15. 
228. United States v. Columbus Country Club, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991). 
229. United States v. Columbus Country Club, No. 87-8164, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11606, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1992). 
In the meantime, the Club's attorney successfully petitioned for the court's leave to 
withdraw from the case. Id. at *3. The Club did not retain new counsel, but instead 
submitted a letter to the judge along with a book regarding the Club's history. Id. at *3-4. 
The court decided the issues before it without the benefit of a brief from the Club. Id. at 
*4. 
230. Id. at *6. 
231. Id. 
232. 919 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1990). 
233. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See infra notes 265-66 and accompanying text for a fur­
ther discussion of Smith. 
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statute regulating boarding houses on free exercise grounds.234 SA op­
erated an Adult Rehabilitation Center, which, among other things, 
housed and fed approximately fifty homeless men.235 SA failed to 
comply with many provisions of the statute. The statute apparently 
did not contain a religious organization exemption, but state officials 
had informally granted SA an exemption from some of its require­
ments.236 However, SA argued that the statute still applied to it, since 
the informal exemption was not legally binding.237 SA contended that 
the statute interfered with SA's and its members' free exercise rights 
by "impermissibly intruding upon the practice of its religion. "238 SA 
also asserted that the statute violated SA's and its members' associa­
tional rights and their First Amendment rights in general,239 Based 
upon the Supreme Court's decision in Smith,240 the Salvation Army 
court held that SA's free exercise challenge could not succeed.241 
The district court in Columbus Country Club found the Club's 
situation analogous to that of the appellant in Salvation Army, and 
stated that "the religious motivation of those who associate for reli­
gious purposes does not entitle them to an exemption from a generally 
applicable statute."242 However, the district court did not specifically 
state why Salvation Army or Smith required its holding. Moreover, 
the district court did not address the Club's argument under the Es­
tablishment Clause. The same issues may be presented again in the 
next case dealing with the scope of the Fair Housing Act's religious 
organization exemption. It therefore is useful to analyze the constitu­
tional issues in a little more depth than did the district court in Colum­
bus Country Club. 
234. Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 183. The New Jersey Rooming and Boarding 
House Act of 1979 required that all rooming and boarding houses be licensed, and regu­
lated "virtually every aspect" of their conduct. Id. at 186. 
235. Id. at 189. 
236. Id. at 185. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. SA declined to state which portions of the statute it objected to. It simply 
continued to maintain that complying with most of the regulations promulgated under the 
statute would interfere with the free exercise of its religion. Id. at 190-91. 
240. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Salvation Army court noted that the Smith decision 
was released while the Salvation Army appeal was pending. Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 
185. See infra notes 265-66 for a discussion of Smith. 
241. Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 185. 
242. United States v. Columbus Country Club, No. 87-8164, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11606, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1992) (citing Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 199). 
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1. 	 Does the Columbus Country Club 243 Majority's 
Interpretation of the Fair Housing Act's Religious 
Organization Exemption Violate the 
Establishment Clause? 
The three-pronged test set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman 244 negates 
the Club's argument that a narrow interpretation of the exemption 
violates the Establishment Clause. Under the first prong, the law must 
first serve a "secular legislative purpose. "245 If Congress' aim in pass­
ing a particular statute is to avoid governmental interference with reli­
gious organizations' abilities to carry out their religious missions, the 
first part of the Lemon test is satisfied.246 This was Congress' intent in 
enacting the original Title VII exemption, the amendment to the Title 
VII exemption,247 and the Fair Housing Act's exemption.248 
The second prong of the Lemon test is satisfied if the law at issue 
has a principal effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.249 
This prong is satisfied unless the government itself has advanced reli­
gion by means of the statute.250 Under the Lemon test, "[a] law is not 
unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion, 
which is their very purpose. The 'establishment' of religion connote[s] 
sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign 
in religious activity."251 Under this test, the Amos Court held that the 
amended Title VII exemption did not advance religion, but simply al­
lowed religious organizations to proceed with their employment deci­
sions without interference from the government.252 The Fair Housing 
Act's exemption cannot be said to advance religion any more than the 
Title VII exemption does, especially if the Columbus Country Club 
majority's narrow interpretation of the exemption is correct. 
The third prong of the Lemon test requires that the statute not 
impermissibly entangle church and state.253 The Amos Court found 
243. 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990), cen. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991). 
244. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See supra note 151. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
Lemon test in Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992), although in Weisman, the Court 
held that the inclusion of a prayer or benediction at a public school graduation ceremony 
could be declared unconstitutional without reference to the Lemon test. Id. at 2655. 
245. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
246. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987). 
247. Id. 
248. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
249. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
250. Amos, 483 U.S. at 337. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. 
253. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. 
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that the 1972 amendment to the Title VII exemption, which had fore­
closed any inquiry into whether an employee was employed in a "reli­
gious" aspect of an employer's activities, did just the opposite of 
impermissibly entangling church and state, by "etfectuat[ing] a more 
complete separation of the two. "254 Thus, the post-1972 Title VII ex­
emption satisfied all three prongs of the Lemon test. 
Requiring a narrow interpretation of the Fair Housing Act's ex­
emption would seem to follow the Amos Court's reasoning and satisfy 
the Lemon test. If a court were required to decide whether a given 
entity is entitled to benefit from the exemption on any basis other than 
an inquiry into whether the entity has a formalized mutual relation­
ship with a church, the court would have to look to other factors. 
Any other test might require the court to decide on the basis of how 
strong the organization's members' religious beliefs are. Any test 
based upon a court's examination of members' religious beliefs is po­
tentially unconstitutional under the third prong of the Lemon test.255 
2. 	 Does the Columbus Country Club 256 Majority's 

Interpretation of the Fair Housing Act's Religious 

Organization Exemption Violate the Free 

Exercise Clause? 

The majority opinion in Columbus Country Club 257 forecloses the 
Club from denying its permission for the sale or transfer of summer 
bungalows to persons who are not Catholic. The majority held that 
the exemption did not apply to the Club because the Club had no for­
mal ties to the Catholic Church. The Club argued that this decision 
interferes with Club members' desire to spend the summer in an exclu­
sively Catholic community.258 Furthermore, if the Club were forced 
to admit a significant number of non-Catholics, the Club's entire char­
acter might change. For example, if the non-Catholic members 
emerged as the majority group, they could conceivably tum the Club 
into an entity that did not sponsor any religious activities. The district 
court found that neither of these two arguments represented a strong 
enough infringement on Club members' free exercise rights to warrant 
254. Amos, 483 U.S. at 339. 
255. See id. 
256. 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991). 
257. Id. 
258. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14-16, United States V. Columbus Country 
Club, 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1196), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991). 
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finding the Act, as applied to the Club, unconstitutional.259 
The Free Exercise Clause would grant the Club members protec­
tion against the occurrence of either of these scenarios only if the 
members could show that an exemption from the Act's provision was 
constitutionally required.260 Even if an exemption for members of a 
religious group is desirable or permissible under the Constitution, if 
such an exemption is not constitutionally required, then the decision 
regarding whether or not to accommodate such groups under the Free 
Exercise Clause should be left to the legislature.261 
In order for a group to show that the Constitution requires an 
exemption on free exercise grounds from an otherwise generally appli­
cable law, it first must show that its members' free exercise rights have 
been significantly interfered with. "'Not all burdens on religion are 
unconstitutional . . . . The state may justify a limitation on religious 
liberty by showing that [the limitation] is essential to accomplish an 
overriding governmental interest.' "262 Furthermore, acts by the gov­
ernment that "have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting con­
trary to their religious beliefs" do not result in constitutionally 
cognizable burdens on free exercise interests.263 If the plaintiffs cannot 
meet the threshold requirement of showing a constitutionally cogniza­
ble burden which tends to coerce them into acting contrary to their 
religious beliefs, the government need not justify its actions by show­
ing that its interest in regulating the conduct at issue is 
"compelling."264 
In Smith,265 the Supreme Court held that the following "civic 
obligations" did not constitute burdens upon free exercise rights which 
require the government to demonstrate that its interest is "compel­
ling": compulsory military service, payment of taxes, compliance with 
259. United States v. Columbus Country Club, No. 87-8164, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11606, at ·7 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1992). 
260. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888, 
890 (1990). 
261. Id. 
262. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983) (denying tax-exempt 
status to religious university which discriminated on the basis of race) (quoting United 
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982». The Bob Jones Court was applying the balanc­
ing test set out in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 
603-04. See supra note 39 and accompanying text for a discussion of this test. 
263. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 
(1988) (involving challenge by Native Americans to U.S. Forest Service's construction of a 
road adjacent to holy places in a federally owned forest). 
264. Id. See also Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem ofBurdens on the 
Free Exercise ofReligion, 102 HARv. L. REV. 933 (1989). 
265. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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compulsory vaccination laws, drug laws, traffic laws, social welfare 
legislation such as minimum wage laws, child labor laws, animal cru­
elty laws, environmental protection laws, and laws providing for 
equality of opportunity for the races.266 The Supreme Court has thus 
included compliance with laws proscribing discrimination within the 
category of noncognizable burdens on free exercise rights. Therefore, 
it is practically certain that any court addressing a free exercise chal­
lenge to the Fair Housing Act's application to an entity such as the 
Columbus Country Club in the future would not require the govern­
ment to show that its interest in achieving compliance with the Act 
was "compelling." 
Thus, in a situation like the one presented by Columbus Country 
Club, the group seeking an exemption from the Act on free exercise 
grounds would first have to show a judicially cognizable burden on its 
free exercise interests. It would have to show that the Fair Housing 
Act, as applied to it, resulted in a tendency to coerce its members into 
acting contrary to their religious beliefs. Requiring a group such as 
the Columbus Country Club to allow non-Catholic members to own 
summer bungalows might harm the unity of the group. The group 
would have to prove that this harm to its structural unity as an exclu­
sively Catholic group tends to coerce its members into acting contrary 
to their religious beliefs. This would be a difficult, if not impossible, 
argument to sustain, and the Columbus Country Club court on re­
mand correctly rejected it.267 Even if the Club is required to allow 
non-Catholic members to purchase summer bungalows, the Catholic 
members would presumably still be able to practice their daily and 
weekly religious observances free of hindrance from the non-Catholic 
members unless those members eventually became the dominant 
group and decided to do away with such observances. Residing in a 
summer cottage among people of other faiths would not necessarily 
coerce the Catholic members of the Club into abandoning or acting 
contrary to their religious beliefs.268 
Furthermore, the Club's free exercise argument ignored the fact 
that, under the Third Circuit's decision in Columbus Country Club, 
the Club would be exempt from the Fair Housing Act if it did in fact 
have formal ties with the Catholic Church. The Club need only enter 
266. Id. at 889 (citations omitted). 
267. United States v. Columbus Country Club, No. 87-8164, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11606 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1992). ' 
268. Id. See supra note 138. 
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into some type of formal agreement with the Church in order to be 
able to limit ownership of the bungalows to Catholics. 
Any future case turning upon the theory that the Fair Housing 
Act's exemption should be broadly interpreted due to the type of Free 
Exercise or Establishment Clause arguments presented by the Club 
will likely fail for the reasons outlined above. The majority's interpre­
tation of the Act's religious exemption should withstand constitutional 
challenges. 
CONCLUSION 
The majority in Columbus Country Club reached the correct re­
sult. The decision would perhaps be on a sounder footing if the major­
ity had engaged in a more extensive analysis, looking to cases 
interpreting the scope of the religious organization exemption con­
tained in other statutes, such as Title VII and state fair housing laws. 
The tests articulated in the district court's decision in Amos,269 EEOC 
v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing CO.270 or Scharon v. St. 
Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals 271 would help courts address­
ing the problem of determining whether an organization is, in fact, 
operated in conjunction with a religious organization. 
An examination of all of the factors derived by combining the 
tests set out in Townley, Scharon, and Amos presents the most com­
prehensive checklist of all. These factors are: whether or not the en­
tity seeking the exemption is formally affiliated with a church; whether 
or not the entity's bylaws or articles of incorporation contain any 
statements of religious purpose, require approval by the church of any 
changes in the bylaws or articles of incorporation, or require that 
church appointees sit on the board of directors or other governing 
body; whether or not the entity is forbidden from deviating from any 
tenet of the members' religion; whether or not, on those grounds, the 
entity has reserved the right to discriminate in employment on the 
basis of religion; and whether or not it has succeeded in asserting such 
a right, if that assertion has been challenged. 
Without such an analysis, courts interpreting the scope of the 
Fair Housing Act's religious organization exemption in the future will 
be left without a comprehensive set of guidelines with which to make 
269. 594 F. Supp. 791 (D. Utah 1984). See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying 
text for an application of the Amos test to the facts of Columbus Country Club. 
270. 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988). See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text 
for an application of the Townley test to the facts of Columbus Country Club. 
271. 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991). See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text 
for an application of the Scharon test to the facts of Columbus Country Club. 
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their determination. It is clear from all of the relevant case law that an 
organization may not benefit from a religious organization exemption 
simply by calling itself religious. A determination of whether or not 
any entity is controlled by, supervised by, or operated in conjunction 
with a religious organization must necessarily rest upon some or all of 
the above factors. 
Claudia J. Reed 
